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COMPENSATION FOR HARM FROM
CHARITABLE ACTIVITY
Charles Robert Trempert
I
INTRODUCTION
On a wintry evening, Carlyle and Perry walk along a city side-
walk near the Mercy Shelter for the Homeless, where Sam, a Shelter
volunteer, has just finished pouring sand on the slippery sidewalk.
Carlyle opens the door to the shelter and enters for the night. As
Perry adjusts his stride to avoid the open door, he falls on the ice,
spraining his back and tearing his coat. Perry's subsequent lawsuit
will allege that Sam (the volunteer) negligently failed to cover the
patch of ice with sand. The suit will seek general and special dam-
ages against Sam in his individual capacity and Mercy Shelter on the
theory of respondeat superior. Shall Sam and Mercy Shelter be com-
pelled to pay full tort damages to Perry? If so, what will happen to
Carlyle and the other beneficiaries of the shelter?
For many years the doctrine of charitable immunity would have
foreclosed suit,' but almost all states have either abandoned or sub-
stantially constricted the doctrine.2 Limitations on the liability of
volunteers exist in some states, although these laws may offer little
real protection.3 Thus, Mercy and Sam may be obligated to com-
pensate Perry completely for his injuries. As a result, Mercy may
not be able to assist Carlyle or otherwise pursue its primary charita-
t Executive Director, Nonprofits' Risk Management & Insurance Institute, Wash-
ington, D.C. While writing this Article, the author was Visiting Associate Professor of
Law, George Washington University and Associate Professor of Law and Psychology,
University of Nebraska. Preparation of this Article was supported in part by a grant
from the Ford Foundation and by the institutional resources of the Program on Non-
Profit Organizations of the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University.
For their encouragement and particularly helpful critiques, the author thanks
Professors Harvey Dale, Henry Hansmann, Jeffrey O'Connell, Harvey Perlman, John
Simon, and the members of the Nonprofit Sector Risk and Insurance Task Force.
1 See Bradley Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The
Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 969, 971-72 (1979) (providing a
brief history of the doctrine); Ronald Lipson, Charitable Immunity: The Plague of Modern
Tort Concepts, 7 CLEv.-MARsHALL L. REv. 483, 484 (1958); Annotation, Tort Immunity of
Nongovernmental Charities, 25 A.L.R. 4TH 517 (1983).
2 Case law and statutes are compiled in CHARLES TREMPER, RECONSIDERING LEGAL
LIABILITY AND INSURANCE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 187-201 (1989).
3 See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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ble mission. Sam and others like him may be less inclined to volun-
teer in the future.
Most states abrogated charitable immunity by imposing full lia-
bility for damages without adequate consideration of whether the
unique characteristics of charitable organizations and volunteers
warrant some other arrangement. For many years after the aboli-
tion of charitable immunity, the infrequency of suits against charita-
ble actors and the availability of inexpensive liability insurance
minimized the impact of the new rules. Not until the mid-1980s,
when the price of liability insurance soared as coverage diminished 4
and a few suits against charitable organizations and volunteers
attracted substantial media attention, 5 did the issue arouse much
interest.
Although the amount charitable organizations pay for liability
insurance is certainly a cause for concern, the proper nature of that
concern is easily misunderstood. If one were interested only in re-
ducing charitable organizations' costs, such measures as rent con-
trol and lower gasoline taxes would have a greater impact. What
gives the debate about tort rules for charitable actors extra signifi-
cance is its role in defining the relationship between charitable
organizations and the community they serve.
In response to the prospect of charitable organizations closing
their doors and potential volunteers staying home, state legislatures
enacted a spate of laws limiting the liability of volunteers, especially
volunteer board members. 6 While most of this legislative activity
has been at the state level, Congress has also taken up the issue. 7 In
4 See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
5 E.g., Thomas Heath, $45,000 Award to Molested Va. Youth Hailed as Victoy by Scouts,
Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1989, at Dl, col. 1; Lisa Green Markoff, A Volunteer's Thankless Task,
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Gary Taylor, Goodwill Must Pay $5M in Murder by
Parolee-Employee, Nat'l L.J., June 8, 1987, at 22, col. 1; David Rohn, YMCA, Pool Victim
Settle: 5-Year-Old to Get $4,000 a Month Initially, Wash. Post, May 17, 1978, at A4, col. 1; see
also Kristen A. Goss, Boy Scouts of America Win Victory in Sex Abuse Case; Jury Fails to Find
Negligence by National Organization, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 24, 1989, at 15, col. 1 (a
well-publicized sexual molestation claim against the Boy Scouts which sought
$430,000,000. At trial, the judge dismissed the punitive damages claim and the jury
absolved the national organization, while holding the local chapter liable for $45,000
compensatory damages); Damond Benningfield, Who's Minding The Nonprofits?, TExAs
INSUROR, Jan./Feb. 1987 (a sexual molestation claimant sought $24,000,000).
6 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
7 The power of Congress to enact tort law is limited. Both the constitutional res-
ervation of rights to the states, U.S. CONsT. amend. X, and the enumeration of powers
that the Constitution bestows upon the Congress, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, constrict fed-
eral authority. In the past, Congress has exercised substantial authority under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause, see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding
conviction of neighborhood loan shark under federal law on basis of congressional find-
ing that loan sharks, as a group, harm interstate commerce), or has conditioned accept-
ance of federal funds on compliance with certain standards. See South Dakota v. Dole,
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the 1990 session, the House of Representatives passed a bill that
provided incentives for states to limit the liability of charitable
organizations and volunteers.8 This bill was a variant of the Volun-
teer Protection Act,9 which Congressman John Porter has intro-
duced in each session since 1986.10 The House bill for the Act was
numbered 911 to convey Porter's conviction that volunteer liability
constitutes an emergency threatening the delivery of vital services. "
President Bush's concern about tort liability of volunteers and their
sponsoring organizations led him to propose a model volunteer
protection law and to call for support of a "privately funded, non-
government controlled center to address the concerns of volunteer
organizations about tort law liability." 12
Most legislative changes and proposals attempt to resolve the
tension between recovery and liability by altering the standards for
imposition of liability, usually by requiring proof of dereliction
greater than mere negligence. '3 This approach allows some injured
parties to recover fully through tort and completely forecloses re-
covery for others. Although the approach serves the goals of reduc-
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (rejecting a tenth amendment challenge to law conditioning federal
highway funds on states' adoption of 21 as mipimum drinking age).
8 The floor actions came on amendments offered to the National and Community
Service Act of 1989 (S. 1430). The Senate voted 65 to 32 against the measure, 136
CONG. REC. S1798 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1990) but the House later adopted the amendment
by voice vote, 136 CONG. REc. H7548 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990). The final version of the
Act that emerged from conference committee did not include the volunteer protection
provisions.
9 The Volunteer Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 911, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
10 The bill would have provided a financial incentive for states to adopt laws reliev-
ing volunteers of personal liability for their negligent acts. The most recent version of
the bill would have increased the social services block grant by one percent for states
that have such laws. As introduced in previous sessions of Congress, the Volunteer Pro-
tection Act would have reduced funding for states that did not protect volunteers. See
133 CONG. REC. S4724 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1987) (statement of Sen. Melcher). The bill
failed despite the support of the Volunteer Protection Coalition, representing approxi-
mately 800 nonprofit organizations. David Hartmann, Volunteer Immunity: Maintaining the
Vitality of the Third Sector of Our Economy, 10 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 63, 68-72 (1989); David
R. Jones, No-Fault Volunteerism, FOUND. NEws, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 58.
11 CongressmanJohn Porter, Volunteers: The Fight for Survival, 1988 LEADERSHIP 12,
12.
12 The White House, Volunteer Liability Protection Initiatives, Press Release (Dec.
13, 1990) (on file with the Cornell Law Review); see also DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MODEL STATE
VOLUNTEER SERVICE ACT AND COMMENTARY (Dec. 1990) (on file with the Cornell Law
Review).
13 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.19 (West Supp. 1990) (liability only for inten-
tional misconduct or knowing violation of law, or for a transaction from which the per-
son derives an improper personal benefit); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.200 (Baldwin
1989) (liability only for bad faith, willfil, or wanton misconduct). Statutes are digested
in NONPROFITS' RISK MANAGEMENT & INS. INST., STATE LIABILITY LAWS FOR CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERS (1990) [hereinafter STATE LIABILITY LAws].
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ing payments, increasing certainty, and encouraging settlements,' 4
the resultant denial of recovery to negligently injured individuals
cannot be justified on any principled basis. 15 Although such a sys-
tem achieves a rough balance of the affected interests, it is neither
the most equitable nor the most efficient alternative. The existing
rules reflect the difficulty of balancing multiple factors that are ex-
tremely difficult to compare and for which intuitions and visceral
reactions have tended to overpower both data and logic.
A more satisfactory system would meet the financial needs of
the neediest individuals injured in the course of charitable activity. 16
Doing that without unduly burdening charitable actors requires
modifying several aspects of the tort and insurance systems along
lines more consistent with the charitable ethos. Tort recovery a-
gainst charitable organizations and volunteers would become a lim-
ited back-up for individuals who would not receive compensation
from first-party insurance or governmental assistance programs.
Such a system would comport better with the driving forces of
the charitable orientation, which differ substantially from the para-
digm of self-serving behavior that informs tort liability rules for
individuals and firms. An adequate arrangement would both imple-
ment the charitable sector's obligation to direct its resources toward
assistance of society's neediest ,members and, reciprocally, account
for the benefits everyone receives from the main thrust of charitable
activities. 7
Toward these ends, this Article proposes adopting the "Chari-
table Redress System," which would give charities and volunteers
the option of promptly paying for specified categories of loss and
14 See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT
LIABILrr REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
15 See Ronald E. Wagner &Jesse M. Reiter, Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice: Stan-
dards of Constitutional Review, 1987 DEr. C.L. REV. 1005.
16 Adjusting the level of damages and incentives for promptly compensating in-
jured parties, rather than raising the standard for laibility, could produce rules that more
sensitively balance the objectives of the tort system and charitable sector. Scholars' and
policy makers' preoccupation with liability standards may blind them to the advantages
of a damages approach. In this regard, Professorjaffe's observation from a previous era
remains apt: "I suggest that the crucial controversy in personal injury torts today is not
in the area of liability but of damages. Questions of liability have great doctrinal fascina-
tion. Questions of damages-and particularly their magnitude-do not lend themselves
so easily to discourse." Louis Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (1953).
17 The proposed arrangement requires a reconceptualization of the relationship
between injured and injuring parties along the lines Professor Hutchinson suggests in
the following comment: "I do not think that there can be any real improvement [in
compensating accident victims] unless there is a crucial shift in the way people think
about themselves as members of a community. Individuals must comprehend that life in
a community entails mutual obligations and interdependence." Allan Hutchinson, Be-
yond No-Fault, 73 CAuF. L. REv. 755, 756-57 (1985).
404 [Vol. 76:401
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thereby foreclosing further liability in tort.18 Proposals with similar
features have been advanced previously, 19 but their application to
products liability, medical malpractice, or tort claims generally have
left them vulnerable to criticism that they are neither efficient nor
just. The special characteristics of charitable actors, however, make
the Charitable Redress System less vulnerable to such criticisms.
To provide background for the Charitable Redress System,
which is described in Part IV of this Article, Part II presents an over-
view of the charitable sector with an emphasis on the effects of po-
tential tort liability. Part III establishes the foundation for the
Charitable Redress System by testing the assumptions upon which
the tort system is based against features of the charitable sector. Fi-
nally, in Part V, the constitutionality and some anticipated effects of
the Charitable Redress System are considered.
II
THE CHARITABLE SECTOR: VIBRANT YET VULNERABLE
The development of law for the charitable sector has long suf-
fered from limited public understanding of what charitable actors
do and how policy alternatives are likely to affect that activity. 20
Only within the past decade has the charitable sector attracted sub-
stantial scholarly attention, and the current state of knowledge still
lags far behind comprehension of either the business or government
sectors.2 1
The dearth of research is especially acute with respect to the
principal empirical issue here: the impact of current tort liability
rules on charitable organizations and volunteers. This Article draws
heavily on research conducted in the course of the Nonprofit Sector
Risk & Insurance Project, which examined legal liability and insur-
ance problems throughout the nonprofit sector, with an emphasis
on charitable human service providers. 22 Pertinent findings from
18 Recovery would be limited principally to out-of-pocket and wage loss, less recov-
eries from collateral sources. See infra Part IV, section A, subsection 2, Compensable
Damages.
19 For example, in 1985, Representative Moore and seven other House members
introduced a bill that would have applied similar rules to claims against Medicare and
Medicaid providers. H.R. 3084, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H6353 (daily ed.
July 25, 1985). Other proposals are mentioned infra note 195.
20 See Virginia A. Hodgkinson & Richard W. Lyman, Preface, in THE FUTURE OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR XV-XVi (V. Hodgkinson & R. Lyman eds. 1989).
21 Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C.L. REV. 501, 503 (1990);
Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFrr SECTOR:
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27, 27 (Walter W. Powell ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR].
22 The Nonprofit Sector Risk & Insurance Project entailed collecting and analyzing
primary materials, such as insurance policies and claims data, as well as conducting over
100 interviews and holding a series of conferences capped by the Nonprofit Sector Risk
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that project are presented in this Part, following an overview of the
charitable sector. The distinguishing features of the charitable sec-
tor that have particular relevance to the formulation of tort rules
receive further attention in Part IV, below.
A. Scope and Nature of the Charitable Sector
The charitable sector is large, diverse, and rapidly expanding.23
It is also ill-defined. 24 The legal concept of "charitable" has proved
remarkably protean, evolving over time in response to changing so-
cietal conditions. For the present purpose of establishing roughly
the dimensions of the charitable sector and the effects of tort liabil-
ity on its operations, the boundary need not be drawn precisely.
Later in the Article, the criteria an organization must possess to
qualify as "charitable" for purposes of special tort liability rules will
receive more attention.25
Section 501(c)(3), the Internal Revenue Code provision that de-
fines charitable organizations that are exempt from ordinary busi-
ness taxes, provides a useful point of departure for mapping the
charitable sector. According to the regulations, that section uses
the term "charitable" in "its generally accepted legal sense." 26 To
qualify for tax exemption, an organization must, inter alia,27 have a
and Insurance Forum, which provided input from experts in several disciplines. See
Kristen A. Goss, Charities May Be Paying Too Much for Liability Insurance, Experts Warn, but
Lack of Data Makes Case Hard to Prove, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 6, 1988, at 15; Kari
Berman, Improve Risk Management in Non-Profit Sector: Experts, Bus. INs., Dec. 5, 1988, at
31. Findings from the Nonprofit Sector Risk & Insurance Project are reported in C.
TREMPER, supra note 2. Based on the information and analyses generated during the
project, a task force of representatives from United Way of America, Independent Sec-
tor, Council on Foundations, and other coalitions of nonprofit organizations issued rec-
ommendations that are reported in RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR RISK
AND INSURANCE TASK FORCE (1989).
23 JON VAN TIL, MAPPING THE THIRD SECTOR 78-81 (1989); Gabriel Rudney, The
Scope and Dimensions of Nonprofit Activity, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 21, at 55.
24 One of the most expansive and malleable definitions comes from the Supreme
Court in a charitable trust case: "A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy
forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to promote the well-doing and
well-being of social man." Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311
(1877).
25 See infra notes 250-69 and accompanying text.
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1976). The Internal Revenue
Service has endorsed this interpretation consistently since 1959 even though Congress
may not have intended to give the word "charitable" in the tax code its ordinary legal
meaning. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 58-64 (5th
ed. 1987).
27 To be eligible for tax exemption, an organization must not publicly support or
oppose any political candidate and must observe strict limits on lobbying or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation. I.R.C §§ 501(c)(3), 501(h) (1989). For a discussion
of the history and policies behind these restrictions, see Theodore Garrett, Federal Tax
406 [Vol. 76:401
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charitable purpose,28 operate "in harmony with the public inter-
est,"29 serve a sufficiently broad public, 30 and not allow its resources
to "inure to the benefit" of any private person.3' For federal tax
exemption and many other purposes, an organization need not rely
on donative financing3 2 or primarily serve the poor.33
Despite having these distinctive features, charitable organ-
Limitations on Political Activities of Public Interest and Educational Organizations, 59 GEo. LJ.
561 (1971).
Nonprofit organizations wishing to avoid these restrictions may retain their tax-
exempt status by operating under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). Donees, however, will be unable
to deduct their contributions to such organizations due to the definition of "charitable
contribution" in I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Whatever the justification for limiting the de-
ductibility of donations to politically active organizations may be, it does not extend to
the tort context.
28 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1989). The concept of a charitable purpose receives substan-
tial elaboration in the regulations for section 501(c)(3). See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(d)(2) (as amended in 1976). Some of the charitable purposes mentioned in section
501(c)(3) are listed infra note 42 and accompanying text.
29 In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court ruled
that to qualify for section 501(c)(3) exemption, an organization "must demonstrably
serve and be in harmony with the public interest. The institution's purpose must not be
so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit
that might otherwise be conferred." Ia at 592 (footnote omitted). On this basis, the
Court denied tax-exempt status to schools with racially discriminatory policies.
30 Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113; Rev. Rul. 56-403, 1956-2 C.B. 307; see also
Columbia Park & Recreation Ass'n v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1 (1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d
465 (4th Cir. 1988). A corollary of this requirement is that a charitable organization
cannot exist primarily to serve private interests. Many such organizations may retain
their tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(6). Without section 501(c)(3) status, how-
ever, contributions to the organization would no longer be deductible, see Rev. Rul. 67-
325 at 116-17; Columbia Park, 88 T.C. at 20 n.43, and would lose access to tax-exempt
bonds. Id at 13 n.35.
The requirement of not primarily serving private interests was rigorously enforced
in a recent case involving a Republican-financed school for campaign operatives. The
Tax Court upheld the IRS denial of exemption on the grounds that the school benefit-
ted primarily private interests and did not serve a charitable class. American Campaign
Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). Because the reasoning of this opinion
clashes with precedents, its effects are impossible to assess meaningfully at this time. See
Republican Campaign School Held Not Tax-Exempt: Much New Law Created, NONPROFIT
CouN s.,July 1989, at 1.
31 This "nondistribution constraint" is enshrined in the language of § 501(c)(3) it-
self, which limits federal income tax exemptions to charitable organizations "no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835, 838 (1980) (speci-
fying the "nondistribution constraint" as an essential characteristic of every nonprofit
organization).
32 See infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing commercial activities of non-
profit organizations).
33 See ChristopherJencks, Who Gives to What?, in THE No'ROrrr SECTOR, supra note
21, at 322. A California court felt compelled to emphasize the difference between the
popular and legal meanings of "charity" by stating, "[r]elief of poverty is not a condition
of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred has a sufficiently widespread social
value, a charitable purpose exists." Estate of Henderson, 17 Cal. 2d 853, 857, 112 P.2d
605, 607 (1941).
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izations are commonly confused with other entities they resemble,
and policy making for the sector suffers as a result.3 4 Like business
firms, charitable organizations may conduct commercial enterprises
and earn a profit, provided their principal objective is charitable and
the profit is not distributed to private owners.3 5 Charitable organ-
izations often have a great deal in common with governmental enti-
ties,36 including shared missions and use of public funds.37 Unlike
the government, however, charitable organizations do not have the
power to tax, nor are their leaders responsible to the electorate.
Without the broad consensus necessary for most government
action, charitable organizations can redistribute resources from
those who are willing to give to a broad class of intended benefi-
ciaries. This redistribution provides more services to the commu-
nity as a whole than would result from government action alone.
Moreover, charitable organizations minister to humankind's spiri-
tual and other psychic needs that government agencies and com-
mercial producers are ill-suited to address. In performing these
functions, charitable organizations improve the human condition
not only by rendering assistance, but also by cultivating the benevo-
lent and compassionate inclinations of donors and volunteers. Re-
gardless of whether these activities are morally superior to business
dealings, the alternative they offer is invaluable for a species that
lacks certainty about the nature of the ultimate good. Undertaking
charitable activities gives society a hedge against pursuing collective
satisfaction only through consumerism and political action.
Part of the popular confusion about the charitable sector may
be attributable to the public's failure to distinguish charitable or-
34 See Carroll Estes, Elizabeth Binney & Linda Bergthold, How the Legitimacy of the
Sector Has Eroded, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 20, at 21.
35 See Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202, 211 (1978) (profit com-
patible with tax exemption). The issue of commercial activities of some charitable
organizations recently has dominated policy making for the charitable sector. See Reid
Lifset, Cash Cows or Sacred Cows: The Politics of the Commercialization Movement, in THE Fu-
TURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 20, at 140; Initial Recommendations by House
Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Republicans on Unrelated Business Income of Tax-Exempt
Organizations, Daily Tax Rptr., Oct. 27, 1986, at 7-1. The significance of commercial
activities for tort rules receives special consideration below. See infra notes 270-78 and
accompanying text.
36 Although government entities may be considered to be a type of charitable
organization for some purposes, they are not treated as such in this Article. Because the
government can spread its costs broadly across the population by levying taxes, inclu-
sion of government entities in the present analysis would muddy the rationales for sepa-
rate tort liability rules for the charitable sector.
37 See ALAN ABRAMSON & LESTER SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEW
FEDERAL BUDGET (1986). Dependence on government funding does not of itself convert
an entity into a governmental body. If it did, many defense contractors would be nation-
alized. At one time, the aerospace industry received 90% of its revenue from federal
contracts. DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 322 (1973).
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ganizations from nonprofit organizations that are not charitable. 8
Many nonprofits are mutual benefit organizations, for example,
social clubs, business leagues, and professional associations.3 9
Although nonprofit and perhaps tax-exempt, these organizations
operate primarily to aid their members rather than to serve the pub-
lic, and are not entitled to be treated as charitable organizations.
The imprecise boundaries of the charitable sector and the oper-
ation of some organizations without formal recognition make it diffi-
cult to measure the size of the sector. The best estimates come from
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), which places the number
of tax-exempt charitable organizations between 500,000 and
750,000.40 Annual operating expenditures for these organizations
in 1986 are estimated to have exceeded $300 billion.4 1 These
organizations are engaged in a great variety of activities, as sug-
38 At least one charitable organization maven has publicly suggested that "pure"
charities may need to purge the "cross-breeds" from their midst if they are to retain
either preferential treatment under the law or a high degree of public support. At the
1988 annual meeting of Independent Sector, Henry Hansmann prophesied the split of
the nonprofit sector into two distinct groups by the end of the century. One would
consist of traditional charities financed in large part by donations; the other would be
comprised of "commercial" nonprofit organizations that derive most of their income
from charges for goods and services. (Remarks summarized in FIRST ALERT, NONPROFIT
WORLD 8 (1988)). Later in 1988, at the Mandel Center's "What is Philanthropy" confer-
ence, Hansmann reiterated his contention that charitable organizations must either dis-
tinguish themselves clearly from "commercial" nonprofit organizations or expect to lose
other benefits just as they lost exemption from certain rules and regulations imposed on
for-profit businesses. (An article based on Hansmann's talk has been published as
Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good
Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807 (1989)). His previous exegesis establishing the
distinction between donative and commercial nonprofit organizations appears in
Hansmann, supra note 31, at 840-41. For a critique of Hansmann's theories, see Atkin-
son, supra note 21; James Ferris & Elizabeth Grady, Fading Distinctions Among the Nonprofit,
Government, and For-Profit Sectors, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note
20, at 123, 136-37.
39 Several states and the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations Act distinguish
between "public benefit" and "mutual benefit" corporations, applying different provi-
sions to each. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 2.02(a)(2) (1988); see
also Ira Mark Ellman, On Developing a Law of Nonprofit Corporations, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 153,
154-55. For a statute reflecting the approach of the Model Act, although adopted prior
to publication of the revised version, see CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5059-5061 (West Supp.
1988). See also Harry Henn &Jeffrey Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit Organ-
izations: California, Here We Come!, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1103, 1133-38 (1981) (discussing
the merits of the California law cited above).
40 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT
61, Table 20 (1987). The 422,103 organizations that are cataloged by the Internal Reve-
nue Service as exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) for being "charitable" organizations do
not include churches and certain related religious organizations that are not required to
file for exemption, nor do they include innumerable small organizations that operate
without formal approval by the IRS. For all tax-exempt organizations, the same table of
the Annual Report reports a total of 978,676.
41 INDEPENDENT SECTOR, DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR, Table 2.2 (2d
ed. 1986, 1988 update).
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gested by the categories enumerated in section 501(c)(3), including
"religious," "scientific," "literary," and "educational. '42
Legions of volunteers work for charitable organizations. Ac-
cording to one nationwide survey, approximately half of the popula-
tion renders volunteer services each year.43 The same survey
estimates annual labor in formal volunteer assignments at nearly fif-
teen billion hours, which is the equivalent of eight million full-time
employees with an assessed value of $150 billion.4 Without these
volunteers, the ability of charitable organizations to perform serv-
ices free or at reduced cost would be substantially diminished.
B. General Liability and Assorted Exceptions
Tort standards for charitable organizations and volunteers have
been in flux throughout the past half century. At one time the doc-
trine of charitable immunity provided charitable organizations with
nearly complete protection from legal liability.45 Although almost
every state recognized charitable immunity at the dawn of the twen-
tieth century, the doctrine was never very secure. Charitable immu-
nity was imported into this country on the strength of an English
case that had previously been overruled 46 and lacked dearly articu-
lated justifications. Thus, most courts needed little prodding to rid-
dle the doctrine with exceptions and eventually abolish it.47
Much of the prodding to end charitable immunity came as part
42 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1989). Section 501(c)(3) also lists "testing for public safety,
... foster[ing] national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part
of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals." The word "charitable" appears on this list of
purposes as a distinct category for organizations that conduct appropriate types of activ-
ities that do not fall within any of the other categories. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(2) (as amended in 1976).
43 INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES 9
(1988). The survey results do not separately identify the portion of this volunteer labor
rendered in the service of governmental entities rather than charitable organizations.
44 Id at 8; c. Paul L. Menchik & Burton A. Weisbrod, Volunteer Labor Supply, 32 J.
PUB. ECON. 159 (1987) (stating somewhat lower numbers, but acknowledging the exis-
tence of higher estimates).
45 See sources cited supra note 1.
46 In McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep.
529 (1886), the court relied on the English case of Holliday v. The Vestry of the Parish
of St. Leonard, 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (Common Pleas, 1861), to deny
recovery against a charitable hospital. Other American courts followed McDonald even
though English courts had overruled Holliday several years before McDonald was de-
cided. Comment, The Immunity of Charitable Institutions From Tort Liability, 11 BAYLOR L.
REV. 86, 88-89 (1959) (authored by John R. Feather).
47 See, e.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (1951) (holding chari-
table corporations liable for their tortious conduct); Harris v. YWCA of Terre Haute,
250 Ind. 491, 497, 237 N.E.2d 242, 245 (1968) (in the court's view, the doctrine of
charitable immunity "was ill conceived and has certainly outlived any usefulness it may
have had at one time"); see also Edith L. Fisch, Charitable Liability for Tort, 10 VILL. L. REV.
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of a broader movement to eliminate barriers to tort recovery.48
Compensating victims became paramount.49 In the interest of
spreading losses and internalizing costs, charitable immunity went
the way of a host of doctrines that had limited businesses' liability
for whatever harm they caused.50 Judges almost uniformly assumed
that any threat liability might once have posed to the vitality of char-
itable activities disappeared with the advent of inexpensive liability
insurance in the early part of this century.51
Subsequent increases in the cost of insurance and the periodic
unavailability of liability coverage, together with changes in the tort
system, have engendered a charitable immunity counter-trend.5 2
During the 1980s, many states created new limitations on the liabil-
ity of charitable actors.53 Almost every state now protects some vol-
unteers, usually directors and officers, from liability for negligent
acts, while still allowing recovery for more flagrant wrongdoing5 4 A
71, 81-85 (1964) (noting various circumstances under which charitable immunity did not
apply).
48 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
6-8 (1988).
49 This theme is made dear in one of the earliest cases to eliminate charitable im-
munity, Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 389,
395-96, 219 N.W. 463, 465-66 (1928). It remains dominant through one of the most
recent cases with the same result, Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479,
487, 234 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1977).
50 See generally Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring opinion emphasizing risk spreading as a justification for
imposing a strict liability standard on manufacturers); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liabil-
ity As an Insurance Market, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985) (discussing the tort system from
an insurance perspective); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985)
(discussing the allocation of losses to business and consumers).
The implications of risk spreading and cost internalization for the liability of chari-
table organizations are discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 121-35 and
accompanying text.
51 In President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, Justice Rutledge
dismissed concern about saving insurance premiums burdening a hospital's budget with
the assertion that "[aidding beneficiaries cannot greatly increase the risk or the pre-
mium. This slight additional expense cannot have the consequences so frequently
feared in judicial circles, but so little realized in experience." 130 F.2d 810, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
52 See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. Not all courts recognize a serious
insurance problem. As late as 1981, one court wrote that the availability of insurance
vitiated concern about the economic impact of liability. Fitzer v. Greater Greenville, S.
C. YMCA, 277 S.C. 1, 4, 282 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1981).
53 See Brenda Trolin, Legislatures Awaken to Charitable Organizations Hit by Liability In-
surance Crisis, 6 PREVENTIVE L. REP. 12 (1987).
54 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.201 (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
58-601 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.264 (1988). Some of the statutes have
been narrowly tailored to limit liability only in circumstances similar to a well-publicized
case that prompted the legislation. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85V (Cum. Supp.
1989) (nonprofit sports programs immune from some types of claims); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8332.1 (Purdon Supp. 1990) (recovery against volunteer coaches limited to
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few states predicate protection of volunteers on the sponsoring
organization maintaining adequate liability insurance or meeting
some other standard. 55 Some states retain limited versions of tradi-
tional charitable immunity.56 Others impose damage caps on re-
coveries against charitable organizations, 57 limit recovery to the
amount of available insurance,58 or protect some assets of charitable
organizations from judgment.5 9
The tremendous diversity of state policies governing tort liabil-
ity of charitable actors suggests the difficulty of reconciling the com-
peting interests. Recognizing that neither full liability nor complete
immunity is wholly satisfactory, states are experimenting with myr-
iad arrangements to achieve an appropriate balance between the
two.
C. The Impact of Tort Liability on Charitable Organizations
and Volunteers
1. Claims Experience
Media reports of claims against charitable organizations and
volunteers strongly influence public perceptions about the riskiness
of charitable activity and the need for modifying liability rules. Dur-
ing the past decade, media coverage contributed to the perception
that injured parties frequently won judgments against charitable
organizations and volunteers. 60 The spate of news stories also fos-
instances in which conduct "falls substantially below the standards generally practiced
and accepted in like circumstances"); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-118 (1988) (nonprofit organ-
izations that sponsor rodeos liable only for willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct).
Volunteer protection statutes are digested in STATE LIABILITY LAws, supra note 13.
55 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3601 (1988); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 5-312(b) (Supp. 1989); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.007(g) (Vernon Supp.
1989).
56 The common law of charitable immunity survives in Arkansas for organizations
that are "created and maintained exclusively for charity." Williams v. Jefferson Hosp.
Ass'n, 246 Ark. 1231, 1235, 442 S.W.2d 243, 244 (1969) (emphasis in original). In
other states, certain categories of charitable organizations are not liable for negligently
caused injury to a beneficiary of the organization. See, e.g., Radiosevic v. Virginia In-
termont College, 633 F. Supp. 1084 (W.D. Va. 1986) (applying Virginia law); Autry v.
Roebuck Park Baptist Church, 285 Ala. 76, 229 So. 2d 469 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-7 (West 1987).
57 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85K (West 1988) ($20,000) (recently upheld in
English v. New England Medical Center, Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 541 N.E.2d 329 (1989));
TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.005 (Vernon Supp. 1990) ($500,000 per per-
son, $1,000,000 per incident, with caveats).
58 See, e.g., Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 196 A.2d 887 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 158 (1980).
59 See, e.g., Mack v. Big Bethel A.M.E. Church, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 713, 188 S.E.2d
915 (1972) (impliedly holding that "charitable" assets are judgment-proof); Hammond
Post, Am. Legion v. Willis, 179 Tenn. 226, 165 S.W.2d 78 (1942) (holding that nojudg-
ment is recoverable out of charitable assets).
60 See sources cited supra note 5.
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tered sympathy for the plight of volunteers and popular charities
faced with lawsuits demanding millions of dollars.
This media version of reality was especially powerful because
no one challenged it with reasonably accurate and complete data
about claims, settlements, and judgments. The best potential
source of such data is the Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), which
systematically collects and analyzes general liability claims informa-
tion on behalf of the domestic insurance industry. 61 Because the
ISO, like most insurance carriers, does not systematically differenti-
ate between claims data for charitable organizations and data for the
business community, separate analysis is impossible. 62
To assess the actual frequency and magnitude of claims against
charitable organizations, several interested parties have surveyed
charitable organizations about their tort liability. 63 Methodological
limitations of these surveys restrict the inferences that should be
drawn from their data, 64 but collectively these surveys suggest that
61 Even without the assistance of the ISO, estimates might be generated from the
databases of the half dozen insurance companies that write the bulk of policies for chari-
table organizations. Because insurance companies derive a competitive advantage from
good data on their policyholders' claims experiences, however, no insurer will unilater-
ally grant access to its data.
62 The class plans many insurance underwriters use do not systematically catego-
rize a policyholder as charitable. The basic element of a class plan is a taxonomy of
entities with rates assigned to each. Only rarely are ISO categories constituted entirely
of charitable organizations. For a thorough discussion of class plans, see ROBERT HOL-
STOM, UNDERWRITING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 137-51, 164 (1973).
Prompted by a New York law that requires insurers admitted in that state to report
data separately for nonprofit organizations, the ISO is in the process of revising its Com-
mercial Lines Manual. The new version subdivides approximately 70 categories to dif-
ferentiate between for-profit and nonprofit policyholders. The result will be better data
on the losses of charitable organizations, but still the data will be inexact because chari-
table organizations will continue to be combined with other nonprofits and governmen-
tal entities. INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, SIMPLIFIED COMMERCIAL LINES MANUAL (draft
1990).
63 Among the most thorough, well-conducted, and widely cited of these surveys are
AMERICAN SOC'Y OF ASS'N EXECUTIVES, THE LIABILITY CRISIS AND THE USE OF VOLUN-
TEERS BY NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONS 8 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter THE LIABILITY CRISIS];
and PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & COMPANY, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILrTY: A CRI-
SIS IN THE MAKING: A STUDY OF NATIONAL NOT-FOR-PROFIT VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
(1987) [hereinafter A CRISIS IN THE MAKING]. A dozen surveys, including the two cited
in this note, are summarized in C. TREMPER, supra note 2, at 166-77.
64 The surveys generally were plagued by small sample sizes and high nonresponse
rates. Ability to generalize results from the two most methodologically sound surveys is
limited because their samples consisted primarily of executives serving large, relatively
well-funded, and sophisticated organizations. In addition, one of those surveys included
many trade associations that are not charitable.
One study of actual claims information from insurance companies provides an addi-
tional reason for skepticism in reviewing the survey results. The study by the Texas
State Board of Insurance, which has significant methodological limitations of its own, is
based on all insurance claims in Texas during a four-month period in 1983. TEXAS LIA-
BILrrY INSURANCE CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY (Feb. 1987). During those four months, 10
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charitable organizations suffer below average losses for the cover-
ages examined. 65 For example, a national survey of 153 executives
of large nonprofit organizations found that only three lawsuits had
resulted from a board or executive action.66 Two of those claims
were settled and the other successfully defended. 67 The results of a
directors and officers insurance program administered by Hunting-
ton T. Block insurance brokerage for 150 to 200 foundations were
similar. During the five years preceding 1988 (which included the
worst of the hard insurance market 68 when directors and officers in-
surance premiums soared) only two claims were filed, neither of
which resulted in a payment to the claimant.69 By contrast, 759 of
the 1708 for-profit businesses the Wyatt Company questioned for its
1987 directors and officers liability survey had been sued in the pre-
ceding five years.70 Over ten percent of the companies (179 of
1708) had at least one claim during 1987 alone.
Although claims against volunteers in their individual capacities
appear to be rare,7' hard data to support this conclusion are not
readily available. An inference may be drawn, however, from the
pricing history of the CIMA Company's volunteer insurance pro-
gram. Between 1978 and 1988, the premium rate for CIMA's Vol-
unteer Insurance Protection policy dropped from $5.00 per
volunteer to 50 cents per volunteer.72 Such a low premium is possi-
ble only if claims against volunteers are uncommon and in-
expensive.
2. Susceptibility to Claims
The demise of charitable immunity has left charitable organ-
izations more susceptible to lawsuits than the level of claims against
claims were filed against nonprofit organizations, resulting in payments of $4,646,885.
The presence or absence of a single large claim in a small survey can wildly alter the
results.
65 A number of feasibility studies undertaken in the process of forming purchasing
groups or risk pooling mechanisms evidently reach similar conclusions (otherwise the
purchasing groups or risk pooling mechanisms would not have been created). The re-
sults of those studies, like insurance company claims data, are not available to the public.
66 A CRISIS IN THE MAKING, supra note 63, at 6.
67 Id.
68 A hard or tight insurance market is one in which premiums rise while the availa-
bility of coverage simultaneously diminishes. See, e.g., Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis
and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE: J. ON REG. 455 (1988).
69 Who Needs D&O Insurance?, FOUND. NEWS, July/Aug. 1988, at 52.
70 Reported in Mark A. Hofmann, D&O Costs Up, Claims Frequency Increasing: Study,
Bus. INs., Dec. 19, 1988, at 1, 64-65.
71 Volunteer Protection Act, 1987: Hearing on S. 929 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess: 11 (1988)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 929].
72 Statement of Marty Laine, Nonprofit Sector Risk and Insurance Forum, in Chi-
cago (Nov. 11, 1988).
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them to date suggests. Several factors that discourage suits against
charitable organizations may account for this discrepancy between
susceptibility to and frequency of suits. Many small charitable
organizations that receive funding on an annual basis and have
neither cash reserves nor other appreciable assets are effectively
judgment-proof. Public attitudes about the propriety of suing a
charitable organization or volunteer may be even more deterring.
Empirical studies of litigiousness have found that numerous consid-
erations, including the victim's subjective appraisal of the potential
defendant's worthiness, influence the decision to sue.73 Although
research is insufficient to prove this surmise, observation of societal
customs suggests that an individual who receives free services may
be less likely to sue than someone who has paid for the same serv-
ices. Furthermore, nonbeneficiaries who recognize the value of
charitable activity and the sacrifices it entails may also be less likely
to sue a charitable organization than they would a business or the
government.74 When charitable organizations and volunteers have
been sued, at least some judges and juries have been disinclined to
find liability or award substantial damages. 75
While these factors tend to reduce the number of suits against
charitable organizations, they do not foreclose the filing of a claim.
Their effects, therefore, are far different from legally binding rules.
Consequently, charitable organizations must act as any business sus-
ceptible to suit would. This often means purchasing liability insur-
ance, and insurance companies base premiums in part on worst case
scenarios. 76 The potential for large claims along with an onslaught
73 See, e.g., Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 701 (1977); Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of
Disputes, 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 655 (1981); Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Individual
Differences and the Pursuit of Legal Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry, 11 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 299
(1987).
74 On the consequences of being nonprofit, let alone charitable, Daniel Fessler con-
jectures, "[t]he public reacts with a disarmed sense of generosity in the face of such a
label." Daniel W. Fessler, Codification and the Nonprofit Corporation: The Philosophical Choices,
Pragmatic Problems, and Drafting Difficulties Encountered in the Formulation of a New Alaska Code,
33 MERCER L. REV. 543, 547 (1982); see also Hansmann, supra note 31, at 896-97. But see
Steven E. Permut, Consumer Perceptions of Nonprofit Enterprise: A Comment on Hansmann, 90
YALE LJ. 1623, 1626-30 (1981) (reporting survey results that consumers generally do
not distinguish sharply between for-profit and nonprofit firms).
75 See, e.g., Big Brother/Big Sister of Metro Atlanta, Inc. v. Terrell, 183 Ga. App.
496, 497, 359 S.E.2d 241, 242 (1987) (screening procedure organization used "came as
close as is practicable for a volunteer-organization" to screen out potential volunteers
predisposed to sexually abuse children). Courts have been reluctant to impose financial
liability on volunteers despite findings of wrongdoing. Even in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes
National Training School, the landmark case that signalled a nonprofit organization's
board member's susceptibility to suit, the negligent directors were not ordered to pay.
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1020-21 (D.D.C. 1974).
76 ROBERT I. MEHR, FUNDAMENTALS OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1986).
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of suits is a prime justification for high liability insurance premiums.
The cost of insurance varies directly with uncertainty because insur-
ers demand a higher rate of return for accepting greater risk.77
When claims become too unpredictable, insurers may withdraw
from the market altogether.78
Many charitable activities pose risks that insurers are reluctant
to cover. Child care providers and other organizations serving mi-
nors are especially difficult to insure because individuals who suffer
harm as young children may file suit up until their twenty-first birth-
day in some states.79 Because charitable organizations usually have
no investor capital to lose in tort claims against them, insurers worry
that those organizations may lack sufficient incentive to exercise due
care and are therefore reluctant to provide coverage80
Aside from risks attendant to serving certain populations and
providing certain services, charitable organizations present one ad-
ditional exposure that is almost unknown among for-profit firms-
the common use of volunteers. Insurers may assume that volun-
teers pose greater liability risks, despite the absence of confirmatory
data. Consequently, general liability insurance policies typically in-
clude employees but not volunteers.8'
Charitable organizations' lack of insurance for volunteers leaves
many volunteers personally liable for judgments against them. This
exposure is especially problematic for volunteers who do not have
personal coverage. Even insured volunteers may find that their
standard personal policies do not cover some actions undertaken as
a volunteer.8 2 Personal umbrella policies and the liability provisions
77 Although the law of large numbers offsets the effect of high variability, with an
insurance pool of any given size, greater uncertainty necessitates higher premiums. For
a discussion of the economics of the insurance market, see R. MEHR, supra note 76.
78 For examples, see 10 Work Camp Insurers Seek to Withdraw from Maine Market, Bus.
INS., Sept. 21, 1987, at 1, 2; Michael Bradford, Two Insurers Drop 7,500 Florida Doctors,
Bus. INS., May, 11, 1987, at 79.
79 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.15 (West 1988). This "long tail" may result in claims being filed under a legal
system far different from the one that operated at the time the policy was written. One
method insurers have adopted for such situations is to offer coverage on a "claims-
made" basis, which effectively limits their long-term exposure. The effect of a "claims-
made" policy from the policyholder's perspective is to increase the likelihood that a
delayed claim will not be covered. Stephen Tarnoff, Regulators Question Claims-Made Form,
Bus. INs., Aug. 5, 1985, at 2; Comment, "Claims-Made" Liability Insurance: Closing the Gaps
with Retroactive Coverage, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 165 (1987) (authored by Carolyn M. France).
80 BYRON STONE & CAROL NORTH, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE FOR NON-
PROFIT MANAGERS 24-26 (1988).
81 See TERRY S. CHAPMAN, MARY L. LAX & ELMER L. STEINBOCK, AM I COVERED FOR
... ? 115-16 (1984); B. STONE & C. NORTH, supra note 80, at 100; Comment, Organ-
izations'Liability for Torts of Volunteers, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1433, 1446-47 (1985) (authored
by Jeffrey D. Kahn).
82 Donald S. Malecki, Non-profit D&O Liability Policy Provides Important Coverage: Per-
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of ordinary homeowners' and renters' policies are limited to bodily
injury and property damage. They do not apply, for example, to a
suit against a board member for wrongful termination of an organ-
ization's executive director. Personal automobile policies do not
cover the commercial transportation of others, which is how an in-
surer may characterize giving rides to an organization's clients on a
regular basis.8 3 Especially when serving newly formed or poorly fi-
nanced organizations, which usually cannot obtain adequate insur-
ance, volunteers may place their personal assets at risk.
3. Program Effects
The possibility of legal liability can radically alter charitable or-
ganizations' activities.8 4 The risk of legal liability may substantially
decrease the resolve or financial ability of a charitable organization
to continue operating, particularly if the organization offers free or
reduced-cost services. Examples include the decisions of some Par-
ent Teacher Associations to end their sponsorship of Boy Scout
troops out of fear that sponsors might be held liable for child abuse
by local scout leaders,8 5 and some youth programs' discontinuation
of physically challenging activities.86
Several nonprofit associations have surveyed charitable organ-
izations to assess the extent to which concern about liability reduces
charitable and volunteer services.8 7 Although none of these surveys
is sufficient by itself to fully illuminate the matter,88 several corrobo-
rate the logical inference that potential liability reduces charitable
sonal Umbrella Is a Poor Substitute, ROUGH NOTEs, Aug. 1986, at 15; Charles Robert Trem-
per, Are Nonprofit Board Members Indecently Exposed? (Book Review), 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 857,
869-70 (1988).
83 The standard Personal Auto Policy from the ISO excludes liability arising from
"ownership or operation of a vehicle while it is being used to carry persons or property
for a fee." ALLiANCE OF AM. INSURERS, PoLIcy Krr 1988 (reprinting 1985 ISO form).
This clause could be interpreted to apply if a volunteer is reimbursed for expenses. If
the injured party was a passenger in the volunteer's vehicle, insurance coverage will be
limited to medical payments rather than the full liability coverage.
84. See Benningfield, supra note 5; Comment, Charity Is No Defense: The Impact of the
Insurance Crisis on Nonprofit Organizations and an Examination of Alternative Insurance Mecha-
nisms, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 599, 604-09 (1988) (authored by Michael Pierce Singsen).
One justification for tort liability is to deter activities that produce more harm than
good. Whether the imposition of tort liability on charitable actors achieves that objec-
tive is considered below. See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
85 Veronica T.Jennings, PTAs Wary of Scout Sponsorships, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1989, at
BI, col. 1.
86 Insurance Increase Forces YMCA To Drop Youth Minibike Program, Christian Science
Monitor, Aug. 14, 1986, at 5, col. 3; Kenneth Reich, Youth Agencies Hit Hard by Soaring
Insurance Costs, L.A. Times, July 19, 1986, Part II, at 1, col. 1.
87 For a list of these surveys, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
88 The surveys targeted large organizations, which typically have insurance or suffi-
cient resources to minimize the likelihood that an injured party would seek redress
against a volunteer. Other methodological limitations are discussed in note 64, supra.
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activity.89 Although few organizations have abandoned their mis-
sions solely because of liability concerns, and even though the sup-
ply of volunteers remains high, exposure to liability can distort
decisions regarding which services to provide and how to deliver
those services. 90
To protect their organizations' assets from potential loss in a
lawsuit, charitable organization administrators could, but generally
do not, use a number of shielding techniques common to the busi-
ness world. For example, well-financed charitable organizations
could create thinly capitalized subsidiaries to offer high risk services
and thus shield the assets of the parent.9' Despite theiflegality and
popularity in the commercial sector,92 such strategies of financial in-
89 See surveys cited supra note 63.
90 In large part, the tort system is designed to promote this very process of weigh-
ing the benefits of action against the potential for liability. The tort system should not
deter beneficial activity, however, by imposing sanctions that exceed the rewards that
may come from conducting the activity. In this respect, charitable organizations and
volunteers are especially vulnerable. An organization may have little choice but to forgo
the activity if forced to bear full liability costs without the prospect of generating reve-
nue from an activity.
91 A thinly capitalized subsidiary is a corporation with minimal assets that is wholly
owned by a parent corporation that may have substantial assets. The two corporations
may have identical boards, and the subsidiary may enter into leases and other arrange-
ments with the parent that allow the subsidiary to use the parent's resources. From a
risk management perspective, the chief advantage of this arrangement is that it ordi-
narily insulates the parent organization from liability for claims against the incorporated
subsidiary. See HARRY HENN & JOHN ALEXANDER, LAw OF CORPORA-T1rONS § 146, at 347
(3d ed. 1983).
Although a third party that brings suit against a subsidiary usually cannot recover
damages from the parent, some cases have permitted injured parties to "pierce the cor-
porate veil." E.g., Sisco-Hamilton Co. v. Lennon, 240 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1957); Robinson
v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 90, 190 N.Y.S.2d 773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959);
Annotation, Liability of Corporation for Torts of Subsidiary, 7 A.L.R. 3D 1343 (1966). In most
states, undercapitalization is not a sufficient reason to disregard the parent/subsidiary
distinction, although it is a highly relevant factor. See DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray
Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1976); see also Anderson v. Abbott, 321
U.S. 349, 362, rehk'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944) (stockholders of bank holding company
held liable for assessment on subsidiary bank). See generally Harvey Gelb, Piercing the
Corporate Veil--The Capitalization Factor, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 4-18 (1982) (stating
proposition that a better inquiry may be whether level of assets is adequate). However,
even when the subsidiary is formed for the express purpose of protecting the parent
from liability, the parent ordinarily is not subject to liability. See Gartner v. Snyder, 607
F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 583 (1941). But see Dixie Coal Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 221 Ala. 331,
128 So. 799 (1930); Goldberg v. Engelberg, 34 Cal. App. 2d 10, 92 P.2d 935 (1939)
(both containing disapproving dicta). Exactly which factors will lead a court to pierce
the corporate veil differs from state to state. Generally, disregard of corporate formali-
ties is an essential element. See David Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE
L. REv. 371 (1981); Roger Meiners, James Mofsky & Robert Tollison, Piercing the Veil of
Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351 (1979).
92 See Comment, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corpora-
tions?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
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sulation are not common among charitable organizations. 93 Liabil-
ity limiting strategies acceptable in the business sector may imperil
the "good citizen" image that entitles charitable organizations to
the high regard and special treatment they generally enjoy. Address-
ing the liability issue directly through a legislative determination of
whether society's interests are best served by holding charitable ac-
tors fully liable for harm is a preferable alternative.
By far the most pervasive effect of tort liability on charitable
organizations is to cause them to buy liability insurance. Very few
charitable organizations other than hospitals and universities have
such substantial reserves that they can self-insure in the way that
many businesses and governmental entities do. Moreover, even if
the managers of charitable organizations are not inclined to
purchase liability insurance, their organizations might need cover-
age to qualify for state licensure or to be eligible for funding from
foundations or government agencies. 94 These factors create a sub-
stantial demand for liability insurance, regardless of price. Accord-
ingly, full understanding of how potential liability affects charitable
activity requires appreciation of the role of liability insurance.
Estimating the total cost of liability insurance for the charitable
sector is extremely difficult because there are no direct measures of
aggregate charitable organization expenditures for any of the rele-
vant budget categories. A rough approximation can be obtained us-
ing available, albeit imperfect, data for operating expenses and the
ratio of insurance expenses to total expenses. Operating expenses
for the independent sector,95 exclusive of health service providers,
totalled approximately one hundred billion dollars in 1986.96 Esti-
93 In Arkansas and New Mexico, repositioning a nonprofit corporation's assets to
insulate them from judgment may nullify statutory limitations on the liability of directors
and officers. Amx. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-120-101 to -104 (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-8-25.3 (Supp. 1989). The tactic is sometimes used, though, if the subsidiary is
expected to generate a profit. See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 87-06012 (Oct. 31, 1986); 87-16004
(Jan. 1, 1987); Carolyn Chiechi, Exempt Parent Can Have For-Profit Subsidiary, 67 J. TAx.
362 (1987).
94 These requirements may reflect a societal judgment that charitable organizations
should be financially responsible for their tortious activity. However, the driving force
behind funders' insistence that recipients be adequatelyinsured probably is to provide a
source of recovery for claims against the organization so that injured parties will not
seek redress against the funders.
95 The term "independent sector" has no precise definition. As used in the source
for the statistics presented here, the independent sector category is comprised almost
exclusively of organizations exempt from federal income tax as charities (i.e., qualifying
under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3)). See VIRGINIA HODGKINSON & MURRAY WErrzMAN, DIMENSIONS
OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR I (3d ed. 1989).
96 Id at 39. The estimate for the health services sector is $104.7 billion. Because
the risks of medical service providers differ enormously from the risks of other charita-
ble organizations, the ratio of insurance premiums to total expenditures for the former
category would not be an accurate estimate for the latter.
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mating an average insurance expense for property and liability cov-
erages (other than motor vehicle) between two and three percent of
total operating expenses, 97 the insurance cost may be calculated be-
tween two and three billion dollars.98
During the hard insurance market of the mid-1980s, 99 many
charitable organizations could not obtain adequate coverage. 10 0
Although total unavailability of insurance was uncommon, the spec-
ter of over one thousand nurse-midwives losing their group pol-
icy1° ' and over one in three child care centers having liability
insurance cancelled or not renewed,10 2 together with the precipi-
97 This estimate is an average of ratios developed from a sample of United Way
agencies and other sources available to the author. The United Way sample includes
data for 200 organizations in five states. Total annual spending for those organizations
in the 1987-1988 period was $250 million, with $5.6 million devoted to property and
liability coverage. Because some organizations purchased package policies and others
did not report separate figures for property and liability insurance, the amount spent for
liability insurance alone could not be estimated.
98 Whatever amount charitable organizations pay for liability insurance, it is proba-
bly more than they should be paying for the coverage they receive and probably far
more than they would pay if the need for insurance were reduced by adopting the pro-
posal offered in this Article. Charitable organizations are likely to pay too much for their
insurance because insurers do not routinely distinguish between charitable organ-
izations and other entities. See supra note 62. As a result, developments affecting only
for-profit enterprises influence insurance premiums for charitable organizations in-
cluded in the same rating category.
99 Innumerable media accounts of the insurance "crisis" are available. See, e.g.,
George Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16; Costlier Insurance
Said to Cover Less Liability, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987, at L36. Among the most compre-
hensive governmental analyses are the two publications from the United States Attorney
General's Tort Policy Working Group: REPORT ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLCY IM-
PLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AvAIAnILrrY AND AFFORDABILITY (Feb.
1986) [hereinafter THE CURRENT CRISIS] and AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILrrY CRISIS (Mar.
1987) (both summarized in An Update on the Liability Crisis, in 2 ISSUES IN INSURANCE 425
(Everett D. Randall 4th ed. 1987)); and, from NEW YORK, INSURING OUR FUTURE: REPORT
OF THE GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE (popularly known as
the JONES REPORT) (1986).
Blame for the hard market has been placed upon three sets of factors: 1) collusion,
2) tort law, and 3) cycles. For a concise summary of the theories, see Kenneth Abraham,
Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987).
100 C. TREMPER, supra note 2, at 7-8; Comment, supra note 84, at 599-609; Bruce
Keppell, Small Nonprofit Agencies Tell of Insurance Dilemma, L.A. Times, May 14, 1987, Part
IV, at 3, col. 2.
101 Liability Insurance Availability (Part 3): Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Transportation and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 432-35 (1986) (statement of Karen Ehrnman); How Nurse-Midwives Regained Their
Insurance Protection, 63 J. AM. INS. 27 (3d Qtr. 1987); Jerry Geisel, Midwives Find Liability
Cover, Bus. INS., July 28, 1986, at 3, 27.
102 NATIONAL ASS'N FOR THE EDUC. OF YOUNG CHILDREN, FINAL REPORT OF THE
CHILD CARE LIABILrrY INSURANCE SURVEY 3 (1986); Margaret LeRoux, Liability Insurers
Are Abandoning Day Care Centers Across the U.S., Bus. INS., June 10, 1985, at 2, 37.
Although this estimate probably exceeds the actual figure because of self-selection bias
and because it includes both for-profit and nonprofit entities, it does suggest the difficul-
ties many organizations faced in the mid-1980s.
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tous increase in premiums,103 fostered a pandemic sense of vulnera-
bility. Many of the insurance policies that remained available
featured sharply increased premiums, lower limits, higher deduct-
ibles, exclusions of more types of incidents, and coverage on a
claims-made rather than occurrence basis.'0 These changes in in-
surance coverage increase the risk that lawsuits pose to charitable
organizations' financial assets.
Subsequent to the insurance crunch of the mid-1980s, premi-
ums dropped and availability of insurance expanded. The cyclicality
of such shifts in price and availability in commercial insurance mar-
kets diminishes the utility of insurance in stabilizing the volatility of
tort liability.' 0 5 The disruptive effects of these insurance cycles are
much greater for charitable organizations than for businesses. For
charitable organizations with strictly limited funds and rigid budget-
ing procedures, contingency planning is especially difficult. A re-
quest for operating funds to cover insurance costs often entails
submission of a proposal more than a year before the premium
comes due. In addition, the goverhment and foundations usually
allocate funds by expense category with little flexibility to shift
money among categories to pay for increased insurance expenses.
Furthermore, for charitable organizations, the strategy of passing
103 Numerous surveys have found large increases in insurance premiums charged
nonprofit organizations during the mid-1980s. The American Society of Association Ex-
ecutives' survey of directors and officers insurance for its members reported an average
increase of 155 percent between 1984 and 1987. THE LuaBr= CRISIS, supra note 63, at
8. In a survey by Independent Sector, 25 percent of the respondents reported an in-
crease of 300 percent or more in their annual.premiums. A CRISIS IN THE MAKING, supra
note 63, at 5. Family services providers, not all of whom were charitable organizations,
experienced an average increase of 132 percent in professional liability premiums from
1985 to 1987. COUNCIL ON ACCREDITATION OF SERVICES FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN,
INC., COUNCIL ON ACCREDITATION SURVEY OF ACCREDITED AGENCIES (Apr. 1988).
104 See THE CURRENT CRISIS, supra note 99, at 53-54. Occurrence policies cover all
incidents during the policy period regardless of when the claim is filed. A claims-made
policy covers an incident that occurs while the policy is in force only if the claim is filed
(or with some policies, if the incident is reported) during the policy period or within the
extended period covered by a special extension to the policy.
105 Although the insurance market dislocations of the mid-1980s were a new experi-
ence for most charitable organizations, they were not unusual for the insurance industry
generally. They were preceded by a products liability insurance "crisis" in the late
1970s; a medical malpractice insurance "crisis" in the mid-1970s; and an automobile
liability insurance "crisis" in the late-1960s. The pattern of soft insurance markets (low
price, ready availability) being replaced by hard insurance markets (high price, restricted
availability) that in turn give way to soft insurance markets is a familiar feature of com-
mercial liability insurance and will likely recur. SeeJ. David Cummins &J. Francois Out-
reville, An International Analysis of Undeunriting Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance, 54 J.
RISK & INS. 246 (1987); Christopher Farrell, The Crisis is Over-But Insurance Will Never Be
the Same, Bus. WEEK, May 25, 1987, at 122; Barbara D. Stewart, Profit Cycles in Property-
Liability Insurance, in 2 ISSUES IN INSURANCE, supra note 99, at 111; Emilio Venezian,
Ratemaking Methods & Profit Cycles in Property & Liability Insurance, 52 J. RISK & INS. 477
(1985); Winter, supra note 68.
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along premium increases to clients or customers is limited by bene-
ficiaries' ability to pay. Finally, many charitable organizations face
greater disruption if they lose their coverage temporarily because
funders or volunteers may be unwilling to accept a heightened risk
of liability. 106
III
THE APPLICATION OF TORT LAW TO CHARrABLE AcTlvrrY:
FAULTY PREMISES AND DUBIOUS INFERENCES
As critics of charitable immunity have persuasively argued,
traditional rationales for denying all tort recovery against charitable
organizations cannot withstand close scrutiny. 10 7 Although these
critics exposed the flaws of charitable immunity, they never offered a
satisfactory replacement for the doctrine they discredited. Demon-
strating that charitable immunity is an indefensible policy does not
prove that applying ordinary tort rules to charitable actors is the
best alternative. A careful analysis of the rationales for imposing
full tort damages reveals that these rationales do not hold against
charitable organizations and volunteers.
Tort liability rules seek to deter injurious behavior, compensate
victims, and spread an activity's losses among the beneficiaries of
that activity.' 0 8 In addition, the tort system manifests societaljudg-
106 The small proportion of the liability insurance market attributable to charitable
organizations places them at a further disadvantage in obtaining appropriately priced
coverage. Charitable organizations' premiums account for only about one percent of
total premium volume for commercial lines. Charles Tremper, Does Your Organization
Scare Insurance Companies?, NON-PROFIT TIMES, June 1989, at 27. Standard underwriting
techniques developed to assess the riskiness of business activities are poorly suited to
assessing the riskiness of charitable activity. Differences in the appropriate interpreta-
tion of charitable organizations' financial statements and those of for-profit enterprises
make a charitable organization look riskier accordixg to conventional underwriting prin-
ciples. SeeJOSEPH RAZEK & GORDON HoscH, INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENTAL AND NOT-
FOR-PROFIT ACCOUNTING (1988). A charitable organization with no annual surplus ap-
pears to be a very unprofitable, hence high-risk, business.
107 Traditional arguments for charitable immunity have been categorized under four
theories: trust fund, implied waiver, respondeat superior, and public policy. See President
and Directors of Georgetown College -. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Fisch, supra note 47, at 88-89; Lipson, supra note 1, at 484-90.
By 1964, "[a]greement as to the inherent invalidity of each of these foundations for
the immunity doctrine [was] all but unanimous among the commentators." Fisch, supra
note 47, at 88 (citation to nine sources omitted). Re-examination of those largely dis-
credited traditional rationales is undertaken here because a number of the factors judges
cited in abolishing charitable immunity several decades ago no longer apply. Most nota-
bly, tort liability today is far more expansive than it once was, with the consequence that
a charitable organization's exposure to suit is much greater than charitable immunity's
detractors had anticipated. Moreover, factors that were insufficient to justify complete
immunity still provide support for an alternative to current tort rules.
108 See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN DOBBS, ROBERT KEETON & DAVID OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In
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ments about the value of various types of activity, the acceptabil-
ity of causing injury, and the nature of obligations to assist those
who suffer harm, thereby manifesting fundamental principles of
justice. 10 9
The dominant myth of modem tort law proclaims that individu-
als who suffer harm at the hands of another are entitled to full com-
pensation for every element of loss.1 0 As an organizing principle of
torts, this myth is useful, but it is also misleading because it implies
that full compensation should enjoy preeminence in the ordering of
social values. As explained in this section, full compensation is not
an a priori right."' The ideal of victim compensation clashes with
and often yields to various other social goods. Accommodation of
these conflicting values has produced a tort system replete with im-
munities, limitations on damages, restrictions on compensable
losses, and other restrictions.1 12 When limitations on recovery are
recognized as necessary to fit the tort system into a multiplex socio-
legal order, the basis for judging their appropriateness becomes
clearer. This understanding leads to a more accurate formulation of
tort law's operative credo: persons causing harm shall compensate
their victims to the maximum extent consistent with accomplish-
ment of other important societal objectives. 1 3
some respects the goals of the tort system resemble the goals of charitable endeavors.
Both the tort system and the charitable sector aim to alleviate distress and transfer re-
sources from more to less fortunate individuals. Conflict exists, however, between the
standards they use in pursuing these goals. Tort law concentrates on the welfare of
individuals victimized by identifiable acts of another person while charity offers its assist-
ance more broadly.
109 See Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2 LAW &
PHIL. 5 (1983); George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAsv. L. REv. 537
(1972); Ernest Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAw & PHIL. 37 (1983).
110 See RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC AN ss OF LAw 149 (2d ed. 1977); Peter Bell,
The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 333, 393
(1984).
111 See infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
112 Some losses are too trivial to trigger tort liability.
Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity. There is
no occasion for the law to intervene with balm for wounded feelings in
every case where a flood of billingsgate is loosed in an argument over a
back fence. The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be
hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 108, at 59.
In a great many areas, barriers to tort recoveries come in the form of immunities or
limitations applying to entire classes of potential defendants. See Richard Burke, Privi-
leges and Immunities in American Law, 31 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1985); Dean Spader, Immunity v.
Liability and the Clash of Fundamental Values: Ancient Mysteries Crying Out for Understanding, 61
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 161 (1985).
113 Along the same line:
It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary func-
tion of tort law and the primary factor influencing its development. It is
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Certain rationales of tort law rest on assumptions about self-
interested behavior' 1 4 that do not always fit the charitable sector. 115
Charitable organizations produce public benefits in a way that dif-
fers sharply from the contribution business activity makes to the
common good. The principal result of commercial exchange is a
gain by both buyer and seller as measured against their personal
utility functions. A transaction will occur only if each party expects
to be better off as a result, independently of any desire to benefit the
general public. As a side effect, gains from the exchange or positive
externalities 116 may redound to society's benefit. By contrast, an ac-
tivity is charitable only if it produces some community benefit in ad-
dition to satisfying the needs of a particular individual.
The operation of charitable organizations routinely produces
positive externalities in two ways. Some types of charitable activi-
ties, like education, produce positive externalities by their very na-
ture. Other activities may produce positive externalities, and be
charitable, only if performed in a certain fashion. By harnessing do-
nations of time, money, and materials, a charitable organization may
deliver free or reduced-cost services to the poor or otherwise
needy. 1 7 The charitable organization, on behalf of its donors and
volunteers, gratuitously transfers the difference between the value
of the service and the amount charged for it.
For-profit businesses operate in exactly the opposite fashion. A
business firm will seek to charge a price for benefits it provides that
perhaps more accurate to describe the primary function as one of deter-
mining when compensation is to be required. Courts leave a loss where it
is unless they find good reason to shift it.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 108, § 4 (footnote omitted).
114 The economic theory of personal utility maximization posits that, on the whole,
people make rational choices that advance their individual welfare in accord with their
personal preferences. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSY-
CHoLOGY 67 (Robin Hogarth & Melvin Reder eds. 1986) (describing and critiquing
standard economic assumptions about human behavior).
115 Economists have attempted to explain altruism and philanthropy in a fashion
consistent with the principle of personal pleasure maximization, possibly because altru-
istic behavior appears to limit the generalizability of key economic assumptions. See
GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HuMAN BEHAVIOR 282-309 (1976); DAVID
FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 489-96 (1986); cf. AmrrAi ETziONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION 51-
53 (1988). Regardless of how fervently the proponents of these explanations assert that
neoclassical economics applies to the actions of charitable organizations and volunteers,
they concede that their theories must be understood somewhat differently in the charita-
ble sector.
116 Positive externalities are benefits from the activity of a producer for which the
producer cannot obtain compensation. For a classic discussion of externalities, see A.C.
PIGoU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1948).
117 A charitable beneficiary might not be poor and might be needy only for a limited
time. When stranded by rising flood waters, a millionaire may be as appropriate an
object of charitable effort as a pauper.
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captures their full monetary value. Gains from exchange may inci-
dentally redound to society's benefit, but business firms, unlike
charitable organizations, always have an incentive to avoid external-
izing benefits. If a for-profit corporation can charge full value for
production of such benefits, it ordinarily will do so to fulfill its obli-
gation to its shareholders.
The functional characteristics of the charitable organization and
the peculiar motivations of charitable actors make full imposition of
liability and damages on charitable actors dysfunctional. As ex-
plained below, deterrence is nonspecific and overly potent," 8 losses
are not spread satisfactorily," 19 and full compensation of victims'
losses sacrifices superior values.' 20 Moreover, in its current form,
the tort system conveys the message that the only injuries that
should alter the behavior of an actor are those for which liability will
be imposed. This message may be appropriate to stimulate eco-
nomically efficient behavior, but it is contrary to the charitable sec-
tor's credos of compassion and benevolence.
A. Deterrence
One of the primary objectives of tort law is to deter harmful
behavior.' 2 ' By internalizing the cost of a loss to the entity that
causes it, the tort system provides a financial incentive to act with
due care. According to orthodox economic theory, failure to shift
the full costs of injuries from victims to tortfeasors results in an inef-
ficiently high level of harm-producing activity and too many
losses.' 22 Requiring charitable actors to pay damages undoubtedly
will impel them to change their behavior; the critical question is
whether those changes will be desirable. In the realms of business
and private affairs for which it was developed, loss internalization
serves the essential function of counterbalancing incentives to bene-
118 See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text. Overdeterrence of socially benefi-
cial conduct may occur in the business community as well. See Stephen Sugarman, Doing
Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 555, 581-82 (1985). Absence of a profit motive
increases the likelihood of overdeterrence in the charitable sector.
119 See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
120 See infra notes 149-68 and accompanying text.
121 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970); R. POSNER, supra note
110, at 154-57.
122 Only activities that are economically inefficient should be deterred. Paraphras-
ing the classic Learned Hand risk-utility maxim, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 291 (1965) denominates an action as negligent "if the risk is of such magnitude as to
outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in
which it is done." If the tort system did not impose liability on this basis, individuals
would not have sufficient incentive to implement cost-efficient loss-reduction measures.
See G. CALABRESI, supra note 121, at 17-18; John Brown, Toward an Economic Theoty of
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
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fit at another's expense. Only if losses are fully monetized will the
profit-oriented accounting of the business sector provide actors with
appropriate financial cues to incur loss-reducing expenses. The de-
terrence rationale for tort liability rests largely on the assumption
that individuals act as personal utility maximizers who implement
risk reduction strategies commensurate with the discounted value
of the loss multipled by the probability of its occurrence. Because of
this, the rationale's validity as applied to charitable actors is
questionable. 123
1. Responsiveness of Charitable Actors to Tort Law's Economic Cues
Although financial considerations plainly influence decisions in
the charitable sphere just as they do in the business sphere, the con-
siderations differ for each. Charitable organizations do not operate
to maximize profit for shareholders and cannot permissibly dis-
tribute profits to private parties. Moreover, unlike business firms,
charitable organizations ordinarily do not recoup from consumers
the largest possible economic return for services performed. A
business firm has a powerful incentive to charge the maximum price
the market will bear. A charitable organization may operate in ex-
actly the opposite fashion. In providing services, a charitable organ-
ization may attempt to maximize the value to society of the
organization's activities relative to the amount charged. 124 Requir-
ing charitable organizations to externalize benefits and simultane-
ously internalize the total costs of producing those benefits by
paying full compensation in tort creates an untenable imbalance.
The economic cues of tort liability do not affect the charitable
organization in the same way they affect business firms. For charita-
ble actors, the bar on distributing profits to private parties elimi-
nates a major incentive to undertake high-risk activities. While
success at an activity with a high tort exposure will earn little, if any,
123 A better understanding of behavior among individuals who serve or control but
do not own charitable organizations could greatly improve the analysis. In addition to
the conclusions that follow from the limited available empirical research on the motives
of charitable actors, see, e.g., BURTON WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988); Den-
nis Young, Entrepreneurship and the Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations: Elements of a Theory, in
THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 161 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986), in-
ferences can be drawn from the structure and dynamics of the charitable sector. Even
outside the charitable sector, the rational utility maximizer model has its limitations. See
Dean Peachey & Melvin Lerner, Law as a Social Trap, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 439, 451-53 (1981).
124 A charitable organization can achieve this result only by marshalling the contri-
butions of donors, volunteers, or government funding. "All nonprofit organizations,
just like profit-seeking organizations, ultimately must cover the full economic cost of all
resources that they consume.... There is no magic by which a nonprofit firm can pro-
duce a service at a lower cost than can a for-profit firm." Hansmann, supra note 31, at
880.
426 [Vol. 76:401
CHARITABLE ACTIVITY
economic reward for the controllers of a charitable organization,
failure may mean extinction of the organization and loss of whatever
benefits the controllers derive from the organization.
The tort system's failure to provide clear, immediate incentives
for taking particular actions to reduce the likelihood of harm height-
ens the likelihood that a charitable organization will be overly cau-
tious in response to a serious threat of liability. 25 Unlike business
entrepreneurs who stand to profit handsomely if their firms operate
successfully at the edge of liability, the controllers of a charitable
organization do not have a strong economic incentive to fine tune
their operations to produce the greatest possible benefit for society
without causing legally cognizable injury. Rather than jeopardize its
mission, a charitable organization may constrain its operations to
remain far from the danger zone of liability.' 26
Conversely, to the extent charitable actors are motivated by
noneconomic forces to provide services and improve society, they
may not eliminate risky activities as readily as would a profit-
maximizing business firm. For some charitable sector decision-
makers, sacrificing material benefits and accepting extra risks may
be a tolerable consequence of working with highly vulnerable popu-
lations.' 27 Thus, even though we cannot be certain how particular
individuals in the charitable sector will respond to the tort system's
economic cues, we can be confident that the model for predicting
business world behavior is inapposite.
The absence of approximate equality between the revenue a
charitable organization receives from its direct consumers and the
value of the services it provides further reduces the utility of the tort
system's economic cues. Imposing the full costs of tort liability on
business firms promotes optimal resource allocation by forcing busi-
nesses into bankruptcy when the total societal benefits it produces
(translated into revenue to the firm) fall below total costs. For chari-
table organizations, the inability to produce revenue in excess of
125 Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REv.
772, 796-99 (1985); Richard Pearson, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic Harm: A Re-
sponse to Professor Bell, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 413, 417 (1984); CorneliusJ. Peck, Compensation
for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1353, 1373
(1974); Richard Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation,
33 VAND. L. REv. 1281 (1980); William Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Ra-
tionality in Tort Themy, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980); Sugarman, supra note 118, at 559-91.
126 For charitable organizations that provide only one service and would cease to
exist if they discontinued that service, the incentive to modify rather than abandon oper-
ations is stronger.
127 The true motivations of charitable actors are unknowable. Professor Dennis
Young reprises a range of conjectures by other commentators in IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR
WHAT? 15 (1983); see also FRANKLIN GAmwELL, BEYOND PREFERENCE 19-28 (1984) (com-
paring motives of profit-seekers and charitable actors).
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costs does not necessarily indicate that the organization lacks utility.
Moreover, imposing the cost of tort liability stymies purely volun-
teer activity rendered without charge. The benefits of such activity
may be immense and the loss slight, but because the organization
does not recoup the monetized value of the benefits, internalizing
losses imposes costs that the organization cannot pay.
Because a charitable organization may deliberately attempt to
produce benefits in excess of fee-for-service income, red ink does
not signal inefficiency the way it does for business firms. Because
revenue for a charitable organization is largely independent of the
costs of operation, a deficit ordinarily calls only for reducing serv-
ices to whatever level the revenue supports rather than stopping the
activity altogether. Thus, higher costs, whether attributable to tort
liability or rent increases, affect a charity's decision regarding con-
tinuation of operations much less directly than they do in the busi-
ness world. 128
The incentive structure that results from imposing full damages
for losses caused by tortious charitable activity is especially skewed
for volunteers. In the course of rendering charitable services, vol-
unteers usually have no opportunity to profit monetarily at the ex-
pense of others. The financial inducements that influence the
behavior of corporate directors are muted because volunteer direc-
tors have no financial stake in an organization and generally do not
receive monetary compensation for serving as a director. Com-
pounding the problem, volunteers of many charitable organizations
have substantial personal assets relative to the organization's re-
sources. An individual's exposure to suit often is greater as a volun-
teer than as an employee, even though volunteers earn no income.
2. Distortions of Liability Insurance
Insurance further distorts the deterrent effects of tort law on
undesirable behavior of charitable actors. To obtain insurance, a
charitable organization must satisfy an insurer that it is an accepta-
ble risk. Once insured, an organization receives its risk manage-
ment cues principally ffom the insurer rather than the tort
128 While tort liability reduces the amount of donations that can be spent on charita-
ble activity, donors' perceptions of that diminution will almost always be much less acute
than the awareness of consumers who pay higher prices or owners who receive lower
profits. Being unaware of exactly how many mouths their contribution will feed or how
much service it will provide, a donor has very little basis upon which to make any judg-
ment about how to respond to liability exposures. Although an organization's efficiency
in delivering services may influence donors' willingness to contribute, it has no direct
effect on the amounts they contribute.
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system. 129 Insurers may require organizations to observe not only
the level of care necessary to avoid an economically inefficient level
of legal liability, but also a higher standard that minimizes the likeli-
hood of a claim.1 30 Insurers can influence program decisions by re-
fusing to insure certain activities, charging differential amounts for
covered risks, and mandating compliance with specified risk man-
agement standards.
Insurers' traditional narrow focus, or lack of focus, on risk re-
duction creates a difficult choice for charitable organizations.
Although insurers may contribute to improving safety, some com-
mentators contend that they do little to promote due care.13 '
Although insurers sometimes have worked with policyholders to re-
duce the risk of loss,132 almost all of that effort has been directed
toward property exposures rather than liability risks.' 33 Insurers'
principal exposure-reducing strategy is refusing coverage to appli-
cants that are perceived to present higher than average risks. The
nature of charitable organizations and the services many of them
perform place them at a severe disadvantage in this process.134 As a
result, charitable organizations may be faced with the unpalatable
choice of discontinuing high-risk services or operating without in-
surance. New organizations, such as AIDS hospices, that come into
129 See KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 10-13 (1988); Sugarman, supra note
118, at 573.
130 The commentators disagree about the extent to which liability insurers can moti-
vate insureds to act with reasonable care. Compare John G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence
in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815, 823 (1967) ("The deterrent function of the law of
torts was severely, perhaps fatally, undermined by the advent of liability insurance.")
with FlemingJames,Jr. &John V. Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 431, 441 (1950) ("IT]here is no substantial reason to believe
that the existence of wide-spread insurance has fostered irresponsibility.").
131 See, e.g., Herbert S. Denenberg, Products Liability Insurance: Impact on Safety and
Implications for the Consumer, in NATIONAL COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY LAw & ADMIN.:
FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND COMMON LAW 247 (1970) (volume 3 of the supplemental
studies to the final report of the national commission); David Hemenway, Private Insur-
ance as an Alternative to Protective Regulation: The Market for Residential Fire Insurance, 15
POL'Y STUD.J. 415, 415-16 (1987); Ralph Nader, Loss Prevention and the Insurance Function,
21 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 679, 680-81 (1987) (contending that insurers are content to
charge higher premiums for greater risks rather than work diligently with policyholders
to reduce the risks).
132 One hundred years ago, industrialists created mutual insurance companies to
insure manufacturing plants and mills. The plant and mill owners who created those
companies put a great deal of effort into safety engineering to protect against fires and
other losses. THE FACTORY MuTUALs: 1835-1935, 200-84 (1935). The Underwriters'
Laboratories developed out of insurers' efforts to improve product safety. HARRY CHASE
BREARLEY, A SYMBOL OF SAFETY 17-23 (1923).
133 See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 580 (citing studies).
134 From an insurer's perspective, any of the following characteristics may justify
denial of coverage: use of volunteers; involvement with minority, infant, or disabled
populations; poorly developed risk management procedures; and absence of surplus.
See B. STONE & C. NORTH, supra note 80, at 34-36.
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existence to meet a pressing community need have almost no pros-
pect of obtaining insurance during their first few years.18 5
3. Nontort Influences on the Riskiness of Charitable Activity
Finally, many factors independent of tort law induce charitable
actors to act responsibly. 136 Such factors include the strong interest
in avoiding injury to oneself, socialization against harming others,
and concern for social opprobrium. In many instances, regulatory
and criminal sanctions deter undesirable conduct. These legal de-
terrents differ from tort law in that a government official rather than
an injured party must bring an action, the proscribed conduct is
specified in advance with relative clarity, and the penalty is fixed
within known limits. These characteristics increase the probability
that managers of charitable organizations will comply with the perti-
nent standards. Because they cannot distribute profits, charitable
organizations do not have as strong an economic incentive as busi-
ness firms do to circumvent regulations.
These factors not only affect how an organization undertakes an
activity; they also influence decisions about which activities an
organization undertakes. Liability is most likely to deter the provi-
sion of services that have the least direct benefit for the service pro-
vider. For example, Little League programs in suburban communi-
ties are likely to survive because the volunteers and other necessary
resources come from the same community that receives the benefit
from the program. 137 The prospect of liability is more likely to dis-
courage suburbanites from volunteering in the inner city.
B. Loss Spreading
Loss spreading is a separate justification for imposing a full
measure of damages on business firms that cause harm. Firms can
spread losses broadly among individuals who benefit from the harm-
causing activity. s8  Depending on the economics of the situation,
135 Congressman Porter tells the prototypical story of ajunior League that sought to
establish a shelter for battered women in Evanston, Illinois. No insurer would offer
coverage during the center's first three years. Faced with the prospect of personal liabil-
ity, the center's organizers abandoned their mission. Porter, supra note 11.
136 See GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE
RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAw AND REGULATION 39-90 (1983); Sugarman, supra
note 118, at 561.
137 Even Little Leagues are hampered by full liability, however. See Hearing on S. 929,
supra note 71, at 176-77 (testimony of Creighton J. Hale, President, Little Leagues of
America).
138 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982), limited by, Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 NJ. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984); Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 35-36, 230 P.2d 220, 229-30 (1951); Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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losses are spread either among consumers through increased prices
or among owners by virtue of lower profits.' 3 9 Either way, someone
who derives a substantial direct benefit from the injury-producing
product or activity bears the cost.
This rationale for loss-spreading in the business sector does not
easily translate to charitable organizations. A charitable organ-
ization has no owners who receive profits and may serve consumers
who do not pay full value. Only if the organization delivers a service
in exchange for a fee that covers the full production cost, including
loss costs, is the loss spread among individuals who benefit directly
from the service.' 40 For the subsidized services typical of the chari-
table sector, losses are spread among donors in the sense that do-
nors' contributions produce fewer charitable benefits per dollar.' 4 '
Because donors do not receive any financial benefit from the injury-
causing activity,' 42 burdening them with the tort losses those activi-
ties produce is less clearly justifiable than spreading losses among
consumers or owners.
143
While losses are spread primarily among donors, the impact of
tort liability falls most directly upon beneficiaries who would have
received services but for the liability-related expenses of a charitable
organization. This result contrasts sharply with the effects of loss-
139 See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 129, at 18-31. Loss spreading in the business sector
occurs regardless of whether a firm insures. Through insurance, businesses can spread
losses among larger pools of investors or consumers.
140 Spreading loss costs among society's least fortunate is itself unappealing in many
cases, especially if the injured party is well-to-do. Nonetheless, losses spread through
the tort system may result in the poor paying for the expenses of the rich. See George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1546 (1987).
141 The work of Henry Hansmann is especially notable for characterizing donors as
purchasers of charitable services who receive value for their money on much the same
basis as ordinary consumers. Hansmann uses the Red Cross as an example to explain
how certain contributors buy disaster relief. The Red Cross is, in a sense, in the busi-
ness of producing and selling that disaster relief. The transaction differs from an
ordinary sale of goods or services only in that the individual who purchases the goods
and services involved is different from the individuals who receive them. Henry
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxa-
tion, 91 YALE LJ. 54, 61 (1981).
142 Regarding charitable hospitals, the Virginia Supreme Court noted, "[t]he citi-
zens who contributed to the hospitals can never get a return in money from their contri-
butions. The charters of the corporations do not permit it, and the donors do not
expect it." City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 91, 116 S.E.2d
79, 82 (1960).
Facile application of economic theory may mask the critical difference between do-
nors on the one hand and owners on the other. According to neoclassical economic
theory, both donors and owners must obtain sufficient value from their uses of money to
induce them to allocate it as they do. Donors receive psychic or other intangible benefits
instead of an economic return. Unlike an economic return, however, psychic benefits do
not provide a source of funds from which to pay a tort award or insurance premiums.
145 Government funding changes this analysis somewhat. The use of tax revenues to
provide charitable services spreads losses among taxpayers.
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spreading in commercial markets. There, consumers are free
(within their economic means) to pay a higher price that includes a
pro rata share of loss costs. This option is not available to potential
recipients of free charitable services. The dynamics of the free ser-
vice delivery system produce a dichotomy in the availability arrange-
ment: prospective beneficiaries either receive a service without
charge or they do not receive it at all. For the distribution of public
goods, therefore, imposing a fee to cover loss costs is not feasible.
Moreover, because charitable organizations do not recoup the
full value of the services they perform, they have no tort reserve to
tap when their activities cause harm.'4 An organization may pro-
duce incalculable positive externalities for years without incident.
When faced with a lawsuit, the organization cannot assign the exter-
nalized benefits it produced in satisfaction of the claim. Likewise,
psychic satisfactions that the organization's donors, employees, and
volunteers might derive from their activities cannot be converted to
cash to pay tort awards.
Assessing the desirability of using charitable organizations as
loss spreaders also requires consideration of loss spreading alterna-
tives. Losses may be spread very effectively via first-party insurance
and government-sponsored health care for the indigent. If a loss is
covered under such a program, compelling compensation from the
charitable organization that caused the harm stands the rationale for
loss spreading on its head. Such losses would be spread more effi-
ciently by the victim's own insurer or the government.' 45 Using
those first-party mechanisms would spread losses across all insureds
or taxpayers, which is much more satisfactory where the cause of the
harm is a charitable organization rather than a business firm.' 46 All
members of the public are assumed to benefit from charitable activ-
ity14 7 and spreading losses through first-party insurance diffuses the
losses as widely as the benefits.
144 A charitable organization may nonetheless have money in the bank. The mere
possession of funds is quite different from a business's surplus that results from captur-
ing the full monetary value of all benefits the business produces.
145 First-party insurance is more efficient than third-party liability insurance because
there is no need to assign responsibility for the loss prior to compensating the victim.
SeeJEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY chs. 10, 11 (1979); Jeffrey O'Connell &
Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means of
Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 55 (1980); Jeffrey O'Connell &
James Guinivan, An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance and
Contraction of Loss Insurance, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 757 (1988).
146 In this respect, charitable activity differs from activities in which the participants
are also the beneficiaries. For those activities, internalizing loss costs so that the activity
bears its full costs ordinarily is the most advantageous and defensible alternative. See
ROBERT E. KEETON &JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC COMPENSATION FOR THE TRAFFIC Vic-
TIM 257-60 (1965).
147 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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The intractable problem with relying exclusively on first-party
insurance for loss spreading is that not everyone is insured. 148 Con-
sequently, loss spreading among charitable organizations through
third-party insurance may be the only available alternative to bur-
dening the victim alone with a loss. Despite the imperfections of
this strategy, it may be a necessary second-best alternative in some
situations.
C. Victim Compensation
The most ancient function of tort law is simply to compensate
injured parties for their losses.' 49 If the attendant right to recovery
vests in the injured party at the moment of the tort, denying full
recovery to the victim of a charitable actor's tortious conduct could
amount to a "taking"' 50 or to extracting an "involuntary contribu-
tion"1 51 from the victim. If full compensation is conceptualized as a
tort victim's inherent right, the involuntary contribution argument is
quite strong. On the other hand, if the measure of compensation is
understood as a compromise that accommodates divergent moral
intuitions and economic factors, the logic of the involuntary contri-
bution argument collapses. This issue must be resolved here since
the conceptualization of entitlement to full tort compensation as an
inherent right would foreclose further inquiry into predominantly
utilitarian arguments for deciding how to assess damages.
148 Experts disagree about the extent to which private health insurance and govern-
ment-sponsored programs would pay benefits in the absence of insurance to individuals
who might seek tort recoveries. Professor Priest has asserted that the percentage of
individuals who would not be able to draw upon some form of insurance or public assist-
ance program if injured is very small. Priest, supra note 140, at 1586-87. Priest's con-
tention on this point is far from being the unanimous view, however. See, e.g., HEm
INS. ASS'N OF AM., 1986-1987 SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA (1988); Randall
R. Bovbjerg & William J. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Pi-
vale Options, 19 IND. L. REv. 857 (1986) (offering much higher estimates of individuals
without access to insurance).
Sick-leave and similar employee benefit plans cover approximately two-thirds of the
workforce, and a larger proportion receives such benefits without a formal agreement.
Daniel N. Price, Income Replacement During Sickness, 1948-78, Soc. SEcURrrY BULL., May
1981, at 18.
149 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 108, at 5-6; Cecil Wright, Introduction to the Law
of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 238, 238 (1944).
150 See Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and Their Continuing Immunity, 100
HARv. L. REv. 1382, 1389-90 (1987).
151 In Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 366-67, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (1951), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court cited FOWLER V. HARPER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 294 for the con-
tention that denying recovery to an injured party on the grounds of charitable immunity
"is to require him to make an unreasonable contribution to the charity, against his will."
The court reached this conclusion even though the victim was receiving services from
the defendant church at the time of injury.
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1. Denial of Full Recovery Does Not Compel Tort Victims to Make
Involuntary Contributions
The involuntary contribution argument is specious. Its surface
appeal stems from use of the pejorative notion of compulsion to
express the more neutral economic concept of subsidization. 152 All
of tort law consists of rules specifying the conditions for allowing
recovery and computing damages. Whether to shift a loss and how
to measure damages are controversial questions capable of many
answers, each of which produces different financial results for in-
jured and injuring parties. Nothing compels the conclusion that
standard tort rules provide the correct benchmark.
To see the artificiality of the involuntary contribution conten-
tion, imagine that charitable organizations enjoy both tort immunity
and exemption from workers' compensation. If a charitable organ-
ization's employee were injured in a workplace accident and denied
recovery, would the employee's involuntary contribution be equal to
the amount she would have received under workers' compensation?
Or would it equal her potential recovery under the tort system? De-
nial of recovery may effectuate a sort of subsidization of charitable
organizations by tort victims, but it is impossible to fairly equate the
subsidization with the amount some other defendant would have
been required to pay.
A separate problem with the logic of the involuntary contribu-
tion argument is that the gain to the individual tortfeasor is rarely
equal to the injured party's loss. An employee's momentary lapse of
judgment, which might have no value at all for the employer-charita-
ble organization, could be very costly. If risk of loss is substituted
for actual loss, the charitable organization might be thought of as
having received the value of operating without adequate precau-
tions. That amount, however, would be a small fraction of the total
152 Transferring the "involuntary contribution" concept to contexts that do not in-
volve charitable organizations helps to expose its vacuity and to reveal how subsidization
should be considered in fashioning tort policy. For example, the victim of an assault by
a negligently paroled convict might be thought of as making an involuntary contribution
to the penal system if the parole board is immune from suit. Negligently injured em-
ployees whose recovery is limited under workers' compensation might be thought of as
involuntarily contributing to either their employers or to other employees who recover
under workers' compensation for workplace injuries that do not result from negligence.
The involuntary contribution formulation does not make sense in either situation. The
question in each case is whether the trade-offs achieve a fair balance. Denial of full
recoveries to the victims of parole board errors and workplace accidents is an integral
part of a larger system that accommodates many interests. The parolee's victim and the
negligently injured worker are not due any particular compensation aside from what the
law entitles them to receive. Tort law's compensation rules are not independently or-
dained natural principles. They result from an attempt to achieve the aims of tort con-
sistently with pursuing a host of other objectives.
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amount the injured party is said to contribute.15 3 Who receives the
remainder of the "contribution"? The only possible answer is other
organizations with loss exposures similar to those of the injuring
organization: Those organizations would need to implement more
expensive measures to prevent injury or pay insurance premiums
based on higher anticipated claims.
This reformulation results in the injured party's contribution
being made not to a single charitable organization, but to the chari-
table sector as a whole, or the portion similar to the injuring organ-
ization. Any element of uncompensated loss might then be seen as
subsidizing a type of activity rather than a particular organization.
To some extent, this loss may be balanced against the free benefits
injured parties receive from charitable activity during their lifetimes.
Thus, the magnitude of the net loss is smaller for harm caused by
charitable activity than for harm caused by other types of activities.
2. Spreading the Impact of Charitable Dollars
If entitlement to a specific level of compensation is not a tort
victim's inherent right, establishing the proper level of compensa-
tion becomes a policy issue that invites a comparison of how charita-
ble organizations use funds that might be allocated to paying tort
awards. Payment of a tort award by a business firm or private indi-
vidual results in a transfer of money from one private use to an-
other. By contrast, payment of a tort award by a charitable organ-
ization results in a transfer of money from a public use to a private
use. A one million dollar tort payment by a charitable organization
results in a private benefit to a particular individual and a commen-
surate reduction of charitable services that produce public bene-
fits. 15 4 Because any recovery by a tort victim harmed by a charitable
actor results in a loss to the charity and an indirect loss to the gen-
eral public, any discussion of the tort liability of charities requires
separate examination of several elements of tort damages.
In a typical personal injury tort case, the plaintiff seeks damages
for both economic loss (e.g., medical bills) and noneconomic losses
(e.g., pain and suffering). In many instances, one source of payment
for the victim's economic loss may be first-party health insurance
153 The charitable organization's savings need not equal die total loss from any sin-
gle incident, but only the amount of the loss multiplied by the likelihood of its occur-
rence. For the charitable sector as a whole, insurers could use the magnitude times
probability computation in establishing premiums for each organization proportional to
their prorated share of losses for the entire sector.
154 If the payment comes from liability insurance funds in a market where risks are
appropriately pooled and priced, the payment will be distributed among organizations
performing similar functions. Therefore, the result is still a one million dollar reduction
in charitable services.
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provided by either a private company or the government. In the
absence of such insurance or for amounts in excess of coverage, ex-
penses must be met in some other fashion. Recovery from the
tortfeasor for these unreimbursed pecuniary losses compensates a
victim for the identifiable financial hardship resulting from a
tortfeasors' act. Repayment for these expenses is clearly restorative.
Even though economic losses may be very costly, imposing them on
charitable actors merely leaves their victims in the same financial po-
sition they would have been in but for the injury.
a. Noneconomic Losses
Although noneconomic losses are no less real than economic
losses, they are not compensable in the same way. 155 The monetary
award a disfigured person receives for pain and suffering may make
the loss more endurable, but it does not reduce the pain or relieve
the suffering.' 56 What victims need are supports for living with the
pain and suffering they endure. Giving them money is an imperfect
remedy that may trivialize the injury and degrade the victim. 157
For injuries caused by businesses or private individuals, mone-
tizing the noneconomic loss is amply justified by the deterrence and
loss spreading functions of torts.1 58 When a charitable actor causes
the harm, the benefits the charitable sector provides to all who en-
dure pain and suffering undercut those justifications.
The impact of awards of noneconomic losses by charitable
organizations and businesses must be viewed in light of commit-
ment to the production of public benefits. Tort victims and many
charitable beneficiaries have suffered misfortune and are appropri-
ate objects of compassion, generosity, and care. 159 Awarding a cash
155 Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of
Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 765, 770 (1987). But cf RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE 61-62 (1981); R. POSNER, supra note 110, at 149-51 (offering the idea of a
hypothetical market for injuries). Judge Posner's market notion may improve the proc-
ess of awarding damages for pain and suffering, but it does not rebut the contention that
the two are fundamentally incommensurable. Availability of money may enable the vic-
tim to purchase goods and services that could be considered very rough substitutes for
health. See also Bell, supra note 110, at 398.
156 As the Supreme Court has observed, "physical suffering must be borne by the
[injured party] alone; the laws of nature prevent this from being evaded or shifted to
another." New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203 (1916).
157 See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE PoLrIcs OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
185, 195-96 (David Kairys ed. 1982); see also Hutchinson, supra note 17, at 762 ("Human
life and suffering represent just one more variable in the production-consumption
equation.").
158 Only by assigning a financial value to noneconomic losses will the tort system
provide most actors with sufficient economic incentive to implement efficient loss-reduc-
tion strategies. Moreover, failure to impose damages for pain and suffering may allow
tortfeasors to benefit at their victims' expense.
159 The tort victim may also be a beneficiary of the charitable sector. One opinion
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sum for the pain and suffering of a charitable organization's tort vic-
tim meets the needs of the victim at a high level while depriving
assistance to numerous potential beneficiaries at the much lower
level charitable organizations ordinarily provide. This result is quite
different from what occurs in the business world, where firms are
neither required to devote their resources to producing public ben-
efits nor prohibited from distributing their profits to private
individuals.
In addition, noneconomic losses are notoriously difficult to
quantify for purposes of compensation. 160 Whatever the theoretical
plausibility of placing a monetary value on disfigurement or paraly-
sis, no satisfactory mechanism exists for performing that task. Con-
sequently, awards for similar injuries vary dramatically. 6 1 A
sympathetic jury, skillful legal representation, and a variety of other
factors that account for the difference between large and small pain
and suffering awards hardly justify compensating some plaintiffs far
more than others. 162 The large element of chance in-the distribu-
tion of pain and suffering awards intensifies the inequity of concen-
trating charitable resources on the few individuals who fare best
under the tort system. 163
Awarding recoveries for pain and suffering may also increase
the net cost of a tort loss to society. Such payments result in a
notes this possibility derisively, observing that if an individual is injured or killed by a
charitable organization, "the chances are high that as a direct result he or the members
of his family will become dependent upon some other nonprofit institution organized for
charitable purposes, unless recovery may be had." Avellone v. St. John's Hosp. 165
Ohio St. 467, 476, 135 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1956) (emphasis in original).
160 See Herb v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 133, 154 A. 582, 584 (1931); THE CURRENT
CRIsIs, supra note 99; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAME-
WORK FOR ACTION 26-28 (May 1987); Ingber, supra note 125, at 778, 804. In establishing
safety regulations, the federal government "has decided, on different days and in differ-
ent ways, that the dollar value of a life is as little as $70,000, as much as $132 million,
anywhere in between and impossible to measure." Marianne Lavelle, Placing a Value on
Human Life, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 10, 1988, at 1, 28, col. 1.
161 See John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1203-04
(1984); Ingber, supra note 125, at 778; Jeffrey O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for
Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 17, 19 (1986).
162 See Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That Cannot Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury
Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 589,
591-93 (1982). After quoting several trial attorneys regarding the effects of strategies to
manipulate jurors' sympathy, O'Connell summarizes:
[L]awyers commonly estimate that the value of pain and suffering from
disability increases by ten percent for every ten years of the claimant's
age over forty; that disability to a female claimant is worth twenty-five
percent more than the same disability to a man; and that disability to a
child is worth much more still. It also explains why injuries of similar
severity, but of differing visibility, fluctuate so in value.
Id at 592.
163 See generally Clarence Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476
(1959).
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double burden on society because they reduce assets of the payor
without directly lessening the recipient's actual loss. 164 This con-
tention has considerably more force when the payment comes from
a charitable organization that must commensurately decrease its
services 165 rather than from a business firm that can spread the loss
across shareholders and consumers.
b. Lost Income
The appropriate level of compensation for lost income also is
not readily apparent. As with out-of-pocket expenses, lost income
directly impairs the financial status of the injured party. Like a
noneconomic loss, though, the value of lost income is conjectural.
Therefore, the rationale for shifting the entire estimated loss of
some victims is less compelling than the rationale for shifting out-
of-pocket losses.
Lost income may be assessed by a variety of methods. Victims
of charitable organizations' torts might be compensated at a single
flat rate for labor they are unable to perform, similar to the single
rate of compensation jurors receive. Alternatively, the court might
award the maximum amount the victims could have earned but for
their injury. Aside from the assessment problems of a full income
replacement standard, its use would deprive workers of any mone-
tary incentive to return to their jobs after suffering an injury. Com-
pensation at a victim's last rate of pay comes closest to the ordinary
tort standard.
The workers' compensation system offers an intermediate alter-
native. Under workers' compensation, injured employees are given
an amount that varies with their wage level, but is less than the full
wage at all levels and is substantially less toward the top of the in-
come scale. The workers' compensation system justifies this level of
compensation largely on the ground that recovery is more readily
available than if the injured party were to proceed in tort.16 6 In ad-
dition, the recovery is not taxed.' 67 Thus, for many workers, the
lower level of compensation approaches their after-tax income.
Higher income individuals, who are less fully compensated under
the system, have the option of independently purchasing first-party
insurance to maintain their pre-injury standard of living. A compen-
164 This argument is advanced by Ingber, supra note 125, at 799.
165 Whether the loss is covered by insurance is irrelevant for this analysis. Insurance
merely spreads the loss among similar organizations. Whether one charitable organ-
ization pays the entire judgment or the cost is spread through the insurance mechanism
to a group of charitable organizations, it results in a transfer of charitable resources to
private parties.
166 See 1 WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TExT 5-13 (1941).
167 Tort recoveries for lost income also are not taxed. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (1989).
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sation system for individuals injured in the course of charitable
activity should most appropriately resemble the workers' compensa-
tion wage replacement system.
c. Collateral Recoveries
According to the logic of the argument against recovery for
noneconomic losses, charitable resources should not be awarded in
excess of actual financial loss. Application of this principle, together
with recognition of the aforementioned problems with loss spread-
ing in the charitable sector, compels reversing the common-law rule
that requires tort defendants to duplicate payments that their vic-
tims receive from collateral sources.1 68 The relatively fortunate in-
dividuals who enjoy health insurance benefits have little claim to
charitable resources. Diverting charitable resources to compensate
them doubly for losses is indefensible. Eliminating duplicate com-
pensation would advance the objective of preserving charitable re-
sources for producing community benefits.
D. The Symbolic Significance of Torts
In addition to its primarily economic functions, the tort system
both reflects and shapes community mores about causing losses and
assisting the victims. 169 Failure to respect societal mores may
delegitimize the tort system and encourage would-be litigants to re-
sort to undesirable self-help remedies. Failure to hold charitable ac-
tors sufficiently responsible for their injury-causing activities may
also threaten the legitimacy of the charitable sector. Thus, the tort
rules for charitable actors should comport at least roughly with
moral intuitions about responsibility and justice.
The recovery an injured person receives depends on multiple
factors that have always included the tortfeasor's status and objec-
tives.170 Therefore, it would not be unprecedented to tailor or limit
the recovery of a tort victim based upon the charitable status of the
168 Commentators have questioned the wisdom of the collateral source rule from
numerous perspectives. See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation
in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1478 (1966); FlemingJames, Social Insurance and Tort Liabil-
ity: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 537 (1952); William Schwartz,
The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REV. 348 (1961).
169 From its earliest incarnation, tort law has evolved in response to "a deep sense of
early common law morality that one who hurts another should compensate him." See
Leon Green, Forseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1961). For
discussions about the symbolic value of awards and the functions of tort law in achieving
retributive or corrective justice, see Coleman, supra note 109; Ingber, supra note 125, at
781. Application of that moral precept today is affected by various forms of insurance
that shift the loss away from either of the parties directly involved in an incident.
170 See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text; see also Martin A. Kottler, Motiva-
tion and Tort Law: Actingfor Economic Gain As a Suspect Motive, 41 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1988).
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actor who caused the injury. True, a traffic accident victim may logi-
cally argue that his injury is no less serious if the driver of the negli-
gently operated vehicle is an employee of United Airlines or a
volunteer for the United Way.17' However, the injured individual
would also be no less harmed if the car had been driven by an indi-
gent, uninsured motorist or propelled by the winds of a tornado. In
either case, compensation from the cause of the loss would be
wholly unavailable under the present tort regime. Denial of recov-
ery based on the status of the actor who caused the injury does not
necessarily violate societal mores.
Whether a sense of justice is violated by rules for charitable
organizations compensating persons they injure also may depend
on whether the injured person is an object of the organization's be-
neficence. One of the rationales advanced for charitable immunity
is that charitable beneficiaries waive their tort rights in exchange for
the free or subsidized services they receive. 172 According to this
reasoning, the needy may freely choose whether to accept a charity's
assistance, but once they do, they will be held to have assumed the
risk of injury or impliedly waived a right of recovery.
The assumption that needy individuals impliedly waive their
tort rights in exchange for assistance is clearly tenable in many situa-
tions. At the most extreme, a person dying of malaria would cer-
tainly relinquish tort rights if necessary to obtain a shot of penicillin
from a liability-averse benefactor. The more difficult question is
whether a waiver should be imposed upon charitable beneficiaries
who are often both unaware of the risks and incapable of rendering
a truly voluntary consent.' 78
Laws in some states accept the implied waiver logic by denying
relief to a charitable organization's nonpaying beneficiaries while al-
lowing "strangers" or paying clients to sue charitable organ-
izations.' 74 Although supported by the implied waiver reasoning,
this policy has the perverse effect of denying recovery to individuals
most likely to be in need while allowing claims by parties having no
connection with a charitable organization to drain its resources.1 75
171 See Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, 91 Idaho 374,421 P.2d 745, 747 (1966) (abolish-
ing charitable immunity doctrine as a defense to tort action where child injured during
church outing).
172 See, e.g., Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hosp., 109 F. 294 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
183 U.S. 695 (1901); Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 184-85, 141 N.W.2d 852, 853
(1966).
173 See Lipson, supra note 1, at 488-89.
174 See, e.g., Egerton v. R.E. Lee Memorial Church, 395 F.2d 381, 382 (4th Cir.
1968); Pomeroy v. Little League Baseball, 142 NJ. Super. 471, 475, 362 A.2d 39, 41
(1976); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987).
175 See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810,
825-27 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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To avoid these undesirable outcomes, most states do not distinguish
between harm to beneficiaries and "outsiders," and some strictly
limit the authority of charitable organizations to extract waivers
from their beneficiaries as a condition of being served.176 On bal-
ance, the inequity of the implied waiver rationale for treating the
recipients of a charitable organization's services differently from
other tort victims outweighs its benefits. Because everyone is as-
sumed to benefit in some way from charitable activity, however, re-
duction of the magnitude of recovery for any person injured by a
charitable organization might be warranted.
E. Special Considerations for Volunteers
Many factors that bear on development of appropriate tort
rules for charitable organizations also apply to volunteers. Absence
of monetary compensation and service on behalf of society are espe-
cially significant. Other features of volunteering render traditional
tort rules even less appropriate for volunteers than for charitable
organizations. Most significantly, tort recoveries against volunteers
imperil their personal assets. In this respect, charitable organ-
izations' volunteers are similar to Good Samaritans who gratuitously
render assistance during an emergency.177
For purposes of developing tort rules for volunteers, the anal-
ogy of volunteers to Good Samaritans is of particular interest. At
common law, Good Samaritans were fully liable for harm from neg-
ligently rendered aid. In response to assertions that this rule dis-
couraged Good Samaritans and imposed liability unfairly,
legislatures in every state enacted laws to reduce Good Samaritans'
exposure to tort liability.' 7s In several respects, the rationale for
protecting charitable volunteers from liability is even stronger than
for protecting Good Samaritans. Many volunteers are exposed to
liability on a continuing basis, which is a greater burden than the
exposure during a single emergency.
Nonetheless, freeing volunteers from liability could imperil the
charitable sector and the society it serves. Especially for charitable
176 In striking down waivers, courts have cited a host of public policy considerations,
most significantly, that charitable beneficiaries are poorly situated to decide freely
whether to surrender potential tort claims in exchange for the services they receive. See
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 102, 383 P.2d 441, 447, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33, 39 (1963).
177 See Lipson, supra note 1, at 500-01.
178 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,186 (1985) (providing immunity for any person
who "renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or other emergency gratui-
tously"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (1989) (providing immunity for any person who
"renders emergency care or assistance, without compensation, to any injured person at
the scene of an accident .... ). See generally Comment, Good Samaritan Laws-Legal Disar-
ray: An Update, 38 MERCER L. REv. 1439 (1987) (authored by Robert A. Mason).
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organizations' directors, some varieties of liability to the organ-
ization 179 and the government' 80 must be preserved to protect the
organization's integrity as well as the public interest. 18' Other vari-
eties of liability are less salutary, however. Each involves a different
set of considerations and consequences pertinent to proposals to
change existing liability or damages standards. 182
One approach limits volunteers' personal liability by holding li-
able the charitable organizations they serve. Such a rule produces
incentives for due care in the charitable sector quite comparable to
arrangements in government and business. For government and
business, the threat of legal liability directly affects the employing
entity but not employees.' l8  Under the Federal Tort Claims Act,18
federal employees enjoy complete protection from suit as individu-
als. In the business world, suits against employees are possible, but
rare because state law, business world dynamics, and custom inhibit
plaintiffs from suing business employees as "deep pockets."' 85
179 In general, directors owe their organizations the duties of care, loyalty, and obe-
dience. See DANIEL KURTZ, BOARD LaAxLrv 21-90 (1988).
180 Liability to the government may arise from tax obligations or regulatory respon-
sibilities. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-83, 1984-1 C.B. 264. Attorneys general in some states
are empowered to bring suit on behalf of a charitable organization to enforce a direc-
tors' duties to the organization. See MARION FREMONT-SMrrH, FOUNDA-IONS AND Gov-
ERNMENT 234-41 (1985); Kenneth Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An
Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REV. 433, 449-60 (1960).
181 For charitable organizations:
iThere are no shareholders waiting in the wings, assisted by squads of
lawyers ready and anxious to commence a derivative action. The stock
will not plummet; the organization will not report a decline in earnings or
sales-there is no easy way to measure or control the quality of
performance.
Abrams, Regulating Charity: The State's Role, 35 Rec. of the City of N.Y.B.A. 481,486
(1980), quoted in D. KURTZ, supra note 179, at 49-50; see also James Fishman, Standards of
Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE L. REV. 389 (1987); Bennet B. Harvey,
Jr., The Public-Spirited Defendant and Others: Liability of Directors and Officers of Not-For-Profit
Corporations, 17J. MARSHALL L. REV. 665 (1984); Lizabeth Moody, State Statutes Governing
Directors of Charitable Corporations, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 749 (1984).
182 See generally articles cited supra note 181; F. Anne Ross, Tort Reform and the Liability
of Officers and Directors of Non-profit Organizations, 28 N.H.B.J. 137 (1987); Roundtable, The
D&O Crisis and Board Liability, DIREcrORS & BOARDS, Summer 1986, at 8; Note, 1986 Ohio
Corporation Amendments: Expanding the Scope of Director Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 663
(1987) (authored by Deborah Cahalane).
Exposing directors and officers to personal liability, while paying them nothing for
their services, may cause them to behave extremely cautiously. Personal liability can
reduce willingness among directors and officers to have their organizations fill the roles
of innovator and path-finder that have led to some of the charitable sector's most valua-
ble contributions to society.
183 See Lewis Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Per-
sonal Liabilityfor Accidents, 70 CAuF. L. REV. 1345, 1346:.47 (1982); Alan Sykes, The Econo-
mies of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 1231, 1231 (1984).
184 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988).
185 See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 572. Employers may have a legal right to in-
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A law protecting volunteers from personal financial loss, while
still allowing injured parties to recover from charitable organ-
izations would resemble the rule that permits recovery from a cor-
poration but not its owners. To stimulate capital formation and
commercial innovation, corporate shareholders ordinarily are insu-
lated from personal liability.' 8 6 This is true even though sharehold-
ers usually benefit to a much greater extent from their corporations'
injury-causing activities than volunteers do from services they per-
form on behalf of charitable organizations. Therefore, by limiting
volunteer liability, the tort system can stimulate charitable activity in
much the same way it encourages commercial activity, but at a much
lower cost.
The analogy of volunteers to corporate shareholders is particu-
larly apt because both provide resources that enable their organ-
izations to function. Although the roles of volunteers and
shareholders differ, their similarity as resource providers warrants
more attention than it has previously received. Heretofore, the
analysis of volunteers' liability has emphasized their participation in
harm-causing activities.' 8 7 According to this analysis, full tort liabil-
ity for volunteers is useful both in deterring volunteers from acting
imprudently and in fairly allocating losses between victims and
torffeasors. Shifting to a conceptualization of volunteers as re-
source providers creates a different analytic perspective. From this
perspective a volunteer is similar to a shareholder who provides a
corporation with operating capital, fully realizing that the corpora-
tion's use of that capital may create a risk of harm to others. With-
out monetary input from the shareholder, the corporation could
cause no losses. Similarly, without labor input of volunteers, chari-
table organizations could not provide volunteer services, and, there-
fore, could cause no losses from those services.8ss Limiting
volunteers' personal liability and imposing liability on the entities
for which volunteers provide resources sensitively balances the in-
terests of injured parties and resource providers.
demnification from their employees, but as a practical matter indemnification is not
sought absent egregious misconduct by an employee.
186 Protecting shareholders from liability is not an essential feature of the corporate
form. Until the last hundred years, shareholders were held personally liable in actions
against a corporation. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual
Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 283 (1909).
187 See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 10, at 72-76; Comment, supra note 81.
188 Although volunteers and employees both render services, volunteers are differ-
ent in that they are the original source of the labor input. Corporate employees are
usually secondary sources whose labor has been purchased with capital raised indepen-
dently. Because volunteers share characteristics of both employees and shareholders,
developing appropriate liability rules for them may require a blending of the liability
rules for employees and shareholders.
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While the case for liability protection is strongest for volun-
teers, similar protection may be warranted for charitable organ-
izations' employees. Some employees of charitable organizations
are underpaid relative to the value society receives from their serv-
ices. 189 To the extent they work for wages less than they could com-
mand in the business world, they may be considered volunteers.' 90
Regardless of their wages, employees in the charitable sector are at
a disadvantage relative to employees of business firms in that their
employers are less likely to carry insurance that covers them or have
adequate resources to indemnify them if they are sued. As a practi-
cal matter, the charitable organization employee is more likely to be
exposed to financial loss. 19 1 Therefore, arrangements that protect
employees from suit may be desirable if they do not unduly sacrifice
other values.
IV
A MORE SurrABLE TORT COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENT
The preceding analysis establishes that society's interests are
optimally served neither by applying ordinary tort rules to charita-
ble actors nor by the recent legislative trend toward insulating chari-
table actors from liability for negligent acts. The rules and
procedures of the Charitable Redress System ("CRS") described in
this Part take account of the special characteristics of charitable ac-
tivity in meeting the tort system's chief objectives of compensating
victims, spreading losses, and deterring inappropriately risky
activities.
The CRS proposal reorients charitable actors' liability for com-
pensating injured parties from full compensation of a few victims,
often long after an incident occurs, to the prompt payment of un-
reimbursed pecuniary losses to a greater number of injured parties.
This treatment is consonant with the charitable objectives of restor-
ing injured individuals to health, alleviating suffering, and meeting
the needs of society's least fortunate. The expeditious assistance in
satisfying an injured person's pressing financial needs also harmo-
nizes with the charitable ethos. The balancing of interests under the
CRS is similar to what states have achieved through workers' com-
pensation systems' 92 and what Congress has provided for with the
189 See TERRY W. McADAM, CAREERS IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: DOING WELL By
DOING GOOD 39 (1986).
190 Alternatively, the work environment may be sufficiently noncomparable that
wage differentials simply reflect nonpecuniary benefits that equalize the combined
psychic and pecuniary rewards.
191 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
192 See JEFFREY O'CONNELL & BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME 127-28 (1986).
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National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. 193 Furthermore, implemen-
tation of the CRS would reduce uncertainty in the recovery process
and preserve a larger share of charitable resources for public
benefit. 194
In light of the problems with loss spreading in the charitable
sector, the CRS relies upon first-party insurance as the primary
mechanism for compensating individuals injured by charitable
organizations. The CRS shifts a loss to a charitable actor only if the
alternative would be leaving the victim with an unreimbursed pecu-
niary loss. When a loss is shifted, the CRS is designed to operate
much like first-party insurance in that the charitable actor or its in-
surer assumes responsibility for paying expenses as they arise.
To satisfy the equities underlying formulation of the CRS, eligi-
bility for its terms must be limited to organizations, individuals, and
activities qualifying as "charitable." Because neither the Internal
Revenue Service definition nor any other legally operative definition
is perfectly suited for this purpose, this Part considers the most ap-
propriate set of criteria for defining what is "charitable." Finally,
this Part considers the possibility of using one of the existing defini-
tions together with additional criteria.
A. Charitable Redress System Features
1. Overview of Features
Under the Charitable Redress System, charitable organizations
and their insurers would be permitted to settle many tort claims by
promptly making a CRS offer. Such an offer would be a standard-
193 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. 300aa-10 to 300aa-
34 (Supp. 1988). Persuaded that liability fears were causing pharmaceutical companies
to withdraw vaccines from the market, Congress created a fund that effectively caps ag-
gregate liability. Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine In-
jury Act of 1986. An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 387 (1987).
Under the Act, children injured by a vaccine are compensated for most of their eco-
nomic losses regardless of whether the manufacturer was negligent.
194 In this regard, payments for claims and insurance premiums are only one aspect
of the diversion of charitable resources when charitable actors are subject to liability.
An attendant expenditure of resources must be allocated to the attorneys and others
who assist the litigation system in establishing fault and assessing damages. See J.
O'CONNELL & B. KELLY, supra note 192, at 123-27. Studies have found that accident
victims receive less than half of the amount spent in personal injury litigation. See, e.g.,
DEBORAH R. HENSLER, MARY E. VAIANA, JAMES S. KAKALIK & MARK A. PETERSON, SPECIAL
REPORT: TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION-THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 27 (1987)
(Rand Corporation publication reporting on its research and surveying the literature).
The remainder is absorbed by attorneys' fees and other associated costs.
Arrangements that provide for victims to receive compensation with a minimum of
economic friction are preferable. Arrangements that reduce litigation have special ap-
peal to the extent they reduce overall expenses and distress. These same features may
be good policy for all tort actions, but they become more acutely desirable when charita-
ble resources are at stake.
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form legal agreement obligating the offeror to pay specified eco-
nomic losses and settlement costs.195 Extending a CRS offer would
protect the organization, as well as its volunteers and employees,
from further liability to the injured party. 196 An injured party would
not be allowed to recover amounts available from collateral sources.
Insurance regulations would be modified slightly to facilitate loss
spreading through first-party insurance.
The tort system would remain available to induce charitable ac-
tors to make CRS offers whenever liability was likely and to honor
obligations assumed under CRS agreements. Injured parties who
did not receive a prompt offer and its stipulated payments would be
permitted to file a tort claim and recover amounts greater than the
CRS award, plus attorneys' fees. The amount recoverable in tort
would be a multiple of a standard CRS recovery.
2. Compensable Damages
The Charitable Redress System is not designed to compensate
for all elements of loss that occur in the course of charitable activity.
Instead, awards would be directed toward paying victims' expenses
and, when the victim was permanently disabled, the cost of helping
the victim adjust to the injury. Thus, monetary damages would not
be awarded for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering, em-
barrassment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium. Using the
simple slip-and-fall scenario at the beginning of this Article, Perry
would be compensated for his torn jacket, his medical costs less in-
surance reimbursements, and a share of any income he may have
lost. As in tort, out-of-pocket expenses 97 would be recoverable if
reasonably necessary to redress harm resulting from the incident for
which compensation is offered.' 98 In most instances, property dam-
195 This arrangement is similar to the "prompt offer alternative" that ProfessorJef-
frey O'Connell has advanced in other contexts. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault"
Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 898 (1985); O'Connell, supra note 162. For a forerunner of O'Connell's proposals,
see TERENCE G. ISON, THE FORENSIC LOTrERY 55-79 (1967).
196 The personal liability of volunteers would be limited to the extent of their liabil-
ity insurance coverage. See infra notes 240-48 and accompanying text.
197 Out-of-pocket expenses are the subset of economic loss for which the injured
party incurs an actual expense (rather than forgoing receipt of some amount). On "eco-
nomic loss," see WM. GARY BAKER & MICHAEL K. SECK, DETERMINING ECONOMIC Loss IN
INJURY AND DEATH CASES 2-3 (1987). An out-of-pocket expense need not have been
actually paid by the injured party. As discussed below, expenses would be billed directly
to the CRS offeror whenever possible. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
The out-of-pocket condition is imposed to indicate that only those costs for which the
injured party is financially liable are recoverable.
198 See DAN D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1, at 543 (1973)
("Any reasonable expense, adequately proved to be the result of the injury, is an item of
damage.").
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age would be fully compensated. For bodily injury, compensable
expenses commonly would include the full costs of medical treat-
ment, prosthetics, therapy, and rehabilitation. For certain injuries,
compensable expenses might include remodeling a residence to
make it accessible by a person with a physical impairment, or psy-
chological counseling to deal with disfigurement. Lost earnings and
loss of life, both of which entail greater speculation, would be as-
sessed somewhat differently than in tort,199 and in most instances
would be paid periodically rather than in a lump sum. 20 0
For nonaccident injuries, the compensation standard is more
difficult to apply. With dignitary torts, such as defamation or inva-
sion of privacy, the principal harm may be nonpecuniary. Thus,
general damages often are awarded. Under the CRS, the damages
against a charitable organization would be limited to actual pecuni-
ary harm, at least where the injury was not inflicted intentionally.
However, since dignitary torts generally result from intentional acts,
the change may have little effect.
In addition to the changes in treatment of ordinary damages,
the CRS requires a different approach to punitive damages. Permit-
ting punitive damage awards against charitable actors would negate
the protections of the CRS against nuisance suits and would burden
the system with the numerous other flaws of punitive damages ac-
tions.201 Therefore, punitive damages actions brought by private
individuals would not be permitted. Eliminating the punitive dam-
199 The workers' compensation standard for lost income might be substituted for
the tort standard. The workers' compensation measure is a compromise between flat-
rate wage compensation and full income replacement. The compromise recognizes a
societal interest in directing charitable resources toward assistance of workers at the
lower end of the pay scale to a greater extent than those in the upper income brackets,
who may more readily obtain disability insurance to spread the lost-income risk among
others with incomes similar to theirs or may make alternative arrangements to bear a
loss of income. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67. For a discussion of wage
recoveries under workers' compensation, see ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION §§ 60.00-60.33 (1988).
200 Either way, collateral sources, including sick leave and life insurance proceeds,
would be deducted from the amount to be paid. If the life insurance is paid in a lump
sum, the CRS annual payments would be scheduled to begin in the year that the life
insurance benefits would have been exhausted if they had been paid according to the
CRS plan. If the life insurance benefits are annuitized, the CRS payments would be
added each year.
201 Critics of punitive damages catalog a daunting list of their defects including the
arbitrariness ofjury decisionmaking about punitive damages, the duplication of criminal
sanctions without criminal justice safeguards, and multiple awards for the same miscon-
duct. Criticisms of and proposals to modify the law on punitive damages are contained
inJason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 1385 (1987); Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled
Approach, 31 HASTINGS .J. 639, 663-69 (1980); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117 (1984). See
generally Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
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ages remedy altogether would be undesirable, however, because
charitable actors are subject to few other control mechanisms. 20 2
The possibility of odious behavior under the guise of charitable ac-
tivity20 3 warrants strengthening the enforcement arsenal of state at-
torneys general 20 4 by vesting them with the authority to file punitive
damages claims against charitable actors ex relatione.20 5
202 Few individuals other than the state attorney general have standing to bring suits
to force charitable organizations to comply with state law or their own charters. See
Harvey, supra note 181; Note, The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a
Right to Member Derivative Suits, 63 N.C.L. REv. 999, 1008-10 (1985) (authored by Brenda
Boykin). Enforcement actions by the Internal Revenue Service, although undertaken for
the purpose of collecting taxes, end some abuses. See, e.g., In re Heritage Village Church
& Missionary Fellowship, Inc. [PTL], 87 Bankr. 401 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 851 F.2d 104 (4th
Cir. 1988).
203 To the dismay of the many truly charitable organizations that operate to benefit
their communities, some organizations that have obtained charitable status have en-
gaged in scurrilous or deliberately hurtful activity. For example, despite being organ-
ized as a charitable (religious) corporation under California law and exempt from
federal income tax under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3), the Church of Scientology engaged in a
pattern of decidedly antisocial behavior. Among the Church's policies was one encour-
aging members to attack any "suppressive person" the church leadership declared to be
"fair game." According to church rules, such a person "[m]ay be deprived of property
or injured by any means by any Scientologist without any discipline of the Scientologist.
May be tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed." Reprinted in Allard v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 443 n.1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 n.1 (1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977). The Church later lost its tax exemption. Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
Similarly, an organization that has racially discriminatory policies may thereby for-
feit its claim to charitable status. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (otherwise charitable schools denied tax exemption because of racially discrimi-
natory policies). Punitive damages in a civil rights suit challenging such discrimination
may be warranted. Fraudulent fundraising is another blight on the charitable landscape.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watson & Hughey Co., 128 Pa. Commw. 484, 563 A.2d 1276
(1989). Allegations of deceptive and other unsavory practices have become sufficiently
serious to gain attention from Congress. In 1989, the Commerce, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Competitiveness Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce held hearings to determine whether the Federal Trade Commission should be
empowered to regulate charitable solicitation. See MacLeod Suggests Congress Give FTC Au-
thority Over Non-Profit Charities, 57 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1427, at 152
(Aug. 3, 1989); Sandra Evans, Tougher Fund-Raising Laws Urged, Wash. Post, July 29,
1989, at B8, col. 1.
204 Historically, the other obligations of state attorneys general have inhibited their
vigorous prosecution of abuses in the charitable sector. See M. FRaxMoNrr-SMrrH, supra
note 180, at 234-41; Karst, supra note 180, at 449-60. Giving attorneys general author-
ity to pursue punitive damages claims on behalf of aggrieved citizens might energize
enforcement generally by providing a financial incentive to press cases. Although an
attorney general is less likely than the aggrieved party to pursue the matter, placing the
responsibility for enforcement under state control should produce more uniform results
and reduce the vulnerability of charitable organizations and their staffs to baseless suits
that are brought because of anger or misunderstanding.
205 I.e., if the organization was directly responsible for the injurious conduct or pol-
icy. An action for punitive damages could not rest upon respondeat superior alone. Tradi-
tionally, respondeat superior has not sufficed to support imposition of punitive damages,
but the rule has been so weakened in many jurisdictions that it needs to be made explicit
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Under the CRS, a charitable organization would be liable for
punitive damages only if it sanctioned conduct deliberately under-
taken with knowledge that it would cause unjustifiable harm.20 6
When this standard is met, punitive damages would serve their ap-
propriate functions of punishing the defendant and deterring mis-
conduct.207 Moreover, if an organization has engaged in activities
that warrant imposition of punitive damages under this standard,
concern about diverting charitable resources is substantially
mooted. The conduct supporting a punitive damages award could
not be considered "charitable" under any recognized definition of
that word. By engaging in such conduct, the organization would
have been violating the public trust and misusing whatever re-
sources it had available. Because the organization would have al-
ready deviated from its charitable mission, holding it liable for
punitive damages would not divert resources from the accomplish-
ment of charitable purposes to the usual extent. Moreover, with the
attorney general alone empowered to bring the claim, any amount
paid could be added to the state treasury for public use.20 8
The CRS would provide for deducting from the award any
amount the offeree is entitled to receive from a collateral source.20 9
under the CRS. See Comment, Punitive Damages and Nonprofit Corporations: To Make the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 19 U.S.F. L. REv. 377 (1985) (authored by Michele Berdinis
Fagin). Punitive damages actions against an individual would not be subject to the
"sanctioned" requirement.
206 Formulating a standard that precisely captures the notion that punitive damages
should be triggered by conduct in gross violation of defensible societal norms is ex-
tremely difficult. Several variations of the formulation offered above may be more suita-
ble depending on how the courts in a particular jurisdiction have interpreted the key
terms. On formulation of a standard for the imposition of punitive damages, see Dorsey
D. Ellis,Jr., Fairness and Eflieny in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 20-23
(1982); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defec-
tive Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 20-28 (1982).
207 Other purposes of punitive damages include compensating victims for otherwise
uncompensable losses, but this is not an appropriate objective of the CRS. See Ellis,
supra note 206, at 1, 12 (contending that punitive damages are justifiable when they both
deter and punish); Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Puni-
tive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 133 (1982) (resting justification on accom-
plishment of either deterrence or punishment).
208 To encourage aggrieved parties to inform the attorney general of situations that
may warrant filing a punitive damages claim, a portion of the recovery might be allo-
cated to the "finder." Some states currently apportion punitive damages awards be-
tween the state and private party plaintiffs. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4)
(1987) (one-third paid to state treasury); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West Supp.
1989) (60% paid to Medical Assistance Trust Fund or General Revenue Fund); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (Supp. 1989) (50% of amount in excess of $20,000 paid to state
treasury).
209 Collateral sources are contractual arrangements and public welfare supports that
pay for expenses an individual incurs as a result of a tortious incident. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979). Although traditional tort law does not call for re-
ducing awards by the amount of collateral sources, several states have recently modified
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This serves two purposes: it most completely allows first-party in-
surance to spread losses incurred in the course of charitable activity,
and it limits recoveries from charitable activity to the pecuniary loss
actually suffered. If private health insurance paid all the medical
bills from an accident, the CRS offeror would have no financial lia-
bility. If the insurance was subject to a deductible or copayment
amount, liability would exist only to that extent.
Denying double recovery for insured amounts and awarding
nothing for noneconomic loss prevents the victim from receiving an
amount above economic loss with which to pay the costs of ob-
taining the award. 210 Accordingly, those costs must be shifted ex-
plicitly to the CRS payor.211 Under the CRS, payments to victims'
attorneys would be made on the same basis as other allowable ex-
penses. 212 These expenses are likely to be insubstantial in most
cases because an attorney would have little to do.2 13 The structure
of the CRS process minimizes the need for extended negotiations.
Moreover, once a CRS offer is extended, and the offeree is fore-
closed from pursuing a tort claim in court, rarely would there be any
need for the expensive process of taking depositions, consulting ex-
perts, and engaging in other activities that have the sole function of
establishing fault at trial.
Finally, charitable actors could not be held jointly and severally
liable. The chiefjustification for joint and several liability is the su-
perior ability of the defendant to spread the loss. 2 14 Because loss
the collateral source rule. See Stanton G. Darling, II, Selected Tort and Civil Justice Issues
Before the 117th Ohio General Assembly, 48 OHIo ST. LJ. 365, 369 (1987). Some states have
modified their laws to deduct amounts received from collateral sources that constitute a
"free" benefit to the injured party, but still allow duplicate recovery based on a private
health insurance contract. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (1987).
210 SeeJeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering
in Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 334-38 (re-
printing passages from The Accident Swindlers: A Special Report, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb.
10-15, Feb. 24-29, Mar. 11, 1980).
211 Although requiring a losing defendant to pay the victor's attorneys' fees is not
the norm in American law, neither is it wholly novel. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) Or
TORTS § 914(1) (1979) (stating general rule that parties pay their own litigation ex-
penses). Fee shifting is common throughout the world and in isolated corners of Ameri-
can law. Most courts are empowered to assess costs against any litigant who abuses the
legal process by filing a baseless suit. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 11. Steeped in the Ameri-
can tradition that litigants pay their own attorneys, judges use this power very infre-
quently. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Oveniew, 1982 DutE L.J. 651; Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to
the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 652-53 (1974).
212 Expenses are to be directly billed to the CRS offeror if feasible or reimbursed at
the claimant's option.
213 Nonetheless, injured parties may need simple legal assistance in evaluating their
claims and securing redress, regardless of whether they contemplate litigation.
214 See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987); Comment, The
Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 728 (1968).
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spreading works so poorly in the charitable sector,215 this rationale
does not apply.
3. Insurance Modifications
State insurance regulations would need to be amended slightly
to support use of first-party insurance as the primary vehicle for
spreading the risk of loss from charitable activity. First, once a char-
itable organization made a CRS offer, an offeree's health, life, auto,
and other first-party policies would have to pay as if the injury oc-
curred without fault. This condition is necessary to trigger pay-
ments that an insurer might otherwise withhold in expectation of
shifting the loss to a third-party tortfeasor. The rule must clarify
that first-party insurance pays first to avoid a stalemate over respon-
sibility to pay. Additionally, the financial obligation of the CRS
payor must be limited to losses in excess of the victim's insurance
benefits. 216
By itself, this rule might result in insurers penalizing policy-
holders for having filed an insurance claim arising from a loss
caused by a charitable actor. Prohibiting insurers from penalizing
policyholders in this way would advance the objective of spreading
losses from charitable activity as broadly as possible. This prohibi-
tion is especially important with respect to automobile insurance,
for which insurers typically raise rates or cancel coverage based on
the number of claims filed. 217 Without a prohibition against adverse
use of claims in the underwriting process, injured parties might lose
their insurance or pay higher premiums because of accidents they
did not cause. This result would defeat the objective of spreading
losses from charitable activity as broadly as possible.
4. The CRS Offer
The CRS offer would be a standard-form agreement obligating
the charitable organization or its insurer to pay all compensable
costs218 in accordance with the terms discussed below.219 Because
CRS offers would be standardized, the range of issues open to nego-
tiation would be narrow and the likelihood of swift settlement would
be much higher than under ordinary tort rules. 220 The principal de-
215 See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
216 By implication, a first-party insurer has no right to subrogation from a CRS
payor.
217 Lisa S. Howard, Auto Rates Affected By Diverse Factors, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP-
ERTY & CASUALTY, June 13, 1988, at 9, 11.
218 Compensable costs are specified in supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
220 The only variability would pertain to prospective economic loss not met through
a structured settlement. This uncertainty might tend to discourage settlement, except
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terminant of settlement assessment would be probability of recovery
if the case went to trial.221 Variation injury awards would no longer
influence the decision because a jury finding of liability would
merely trigger an obligation to compensate upon the same terms as
a CRS offer, albeit at a multiple of what the defendant would have
been obligated to pay if the case had been settled without trial. 222
a. Prompt Offer Triggers CRS
To injured parties with few resources, the timing of a recovery
may be of greater interest than the amount.228 The possibility of a
large award sometime in the distant future does little to satisfy the
immediate need to pay bills. If unable to secure funds quickly, an
individual may fail to obtain adequate treatment and commence re-
habilitation promptly. All of this is incompatible with the major
charitable objective of alleviating the suffering that results when in-
jured parties are unable to pay for needed services. The CRS pro-
vides for direct payment of expenses by the CRS offeror as quickly
as possible after the precipitating incident.
Ideally, a CRS offer would immediately follow an incident, so
injured parties would experience minimal uncertainty and financial
distress. As a practical matter, however, investigation and formal
approval will necessitate some delay in many cases. 224 The CRS bal-
ances the need for prompt payment against the need for investiga-
tion and formal approval by imposing a 90-day time limit for
threshold offers that activate a portion of the CRS features, and a
180-day limit for full CRS offers.225 A threshold offer differs from a
that the alternative recovery in tort would be equally uncertain. Even in these instances,
an offer may be extended with the amount to be paid subject to determination by a court
or other neutral party.
221 An injured party who does not receive a CRS offer would be permitted to sue
and potentially recover damages 50% higher than the CRS net amount, plus attorneys'
fees. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
222 See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
223 See T. IsoN, supra note 195, at 14; Marc Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery:
Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 780 (1967).
224 Reorienting charitable organizations toward swiftly meeting victims' pecuniary
losses may lead some organizations to adopt policies that go beyond what the CRS re-
quires. The policy of one large metropolitan museum for responding to slip-and-fall
accidents provides an example of a model that may become more common. Aware that
the museum was sued routinely for slip-and-fall accidents, the museum's board of direc-
tors authorized prospective payment of emergency medical services to such victims. In a
typical incident, injured patrons are transported immediately to a hospital emergency
room where they receive appropriate medical attention at the museum's expense. In the
years since adopting this policy, the museum has not been sued. Statement of James
Strickland, President, Human Services Risk Management, at the Nonprofit Sector Risk
and Insurance Forum, in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 11, 1988).
225 Making an offer within the time periods forecloses the offeree's right to sue.
Either offer may be extended sooner than the expiration of these time periods, which
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full offer in that it obligates the offeror to pay only expenses in-
curred as of the date of the offer or during the time the offer re-
mains in effect. A threshold offer assures its recipient of payment
for expenses incurred immediately following the incident, but does
not obligate the offeror to pay all future expenses. 226
b. Expenses to be Paid as Incurred
Receiving an offer to pay expenses promptly greatly reduces the
hardship victims face when presented with uninsured medical bills
or other expenses after an injury. Actually having those bills paid
completes the process. Under the ordinary tort system, victims usu-
ally must pay their own bills and await settlement of their claim for
reimbursement.227 The CRS would reduce the need for victims to
front payments by having CRS offerors pay compensable expenses
directly to the service provider whenever possible and having the
offerors reimburse victims swiftly when direct payment is not possi-
ble. In a typical incident, the victim may need to pay emergency
expenses incurred before a CRS offer has been tendered, but the
90-day limit on making a threshold offer should shift payment re-
sponsibility to the offeror before payment is necessary. Although
the CRS would not absolve injured parties of personal responsibility
for the bills,2 28 it could greatly reduce typical cash-flow problems.229
begin to run when the charitable organization receives a written claim from the injured
party. Where liability is clear and the necessary authorization available quickly, the
threshold offer step could be eliminated. Conversely, an offer may be made after the
time limits. If so, however, the offeree would be free to reject it and sue in tort.
226 The threshold offer would be useful if a potential offeror needs more than 90
days to assess liability and obtain approval for a full offer. Until deciding whether to
extend a full offer or cancel the threshold offer, the offeror must honor the CRS offer's
terms or become subject to the penalties for noncompliance.
227 The Model Periodic Payment of'Judgments Act allows plaintiffs (and defendants)
to choose periodic payments in some circumstances. See HANDBOOK NAT'L CONF.
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws & PROC. ANNUAL CONF. 187 (1980). At least 10 states
have passed legislation authorizing some type of periodic payment arrangement. See
Darling, supra note 209, at 368.
228 Imagine, for example, that an uninsured organization becomes bankrupt shortly
after an incident and leaves no assets. In this situation, the victim is left without re-
course. The victim is no worse off, however, than he or she would be under the present
tort system. On the whole, the CRS will reduce the impact of bankruptcy on victims'
claims by reducing the average delay between an incident and the time claims begin to
be paid. Settlement delays currently can result in a bankruptcy occurring several years
after an incident, destroying a victim's prospect of recovery. See Comment, The Case of
the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic Analysis, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 145 (1983). Under the
CRS, such occurrences will be diminished whenever an organization opts to meet the
CRS requirement of prompt, periodic payment.
229 Only if service providers demand payment from the patient or client at the time
of service will the utility of the direct payment feature be thwarted. Because the CRS
payments would often come from the liability insurance carrier for the responsible chari-
table organization, rather than the organization itself, service providers are likely to ac-
cept the third-party payment on the same basis as they accept payment from first-party
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In cases of death or long-term disability, a lump sum payment
may be necessary to allow insurers to close their books and protect
offerees from insurer insolvency. At the end of three years, either
the CRS payor or the recipient may elect to terminate periodic pay-
ments in favor of a final lump sum settlement, which may be annui-
tized. Failure to reach agreement on the amount could lead to a
trial or arbitration on that single issue, with the CRS payor being
obligated to pay the recipient's attorneys' fees if the offeree is
awarded an amount higher than the offer.
5. Modified Tort System Available If No Offer Extended
If a charitable organization declined to make a CRS offer,230 or
if a CRS offeror failed to honor its commitments, the tort system
would remain available as a last resort. If a tort suit ensued, the
CRS would not modify the liability standard, but would change the
measure of damages. To maximize the utility of the CRS as an alter-
native compensation scheme, damages at trial would be figured as a
multiple of what the plaintiff would have been entitled to receive
under the CRS, plus attorneys' fees. The difficulty here is setting
the proper multiple. If plaintiffs could recover only the CRS net
award, charitable organizations and their insurers would have insuf-
ficient economic incentive to make CRS offers. 231 Using the
ordinary tort damages standard, on the other hand, would give in-
jured parties too much power to threaten charitable organizations
that resist settlement of baseless claims. An appropriate balance
might be achieved by allowing a recovery in tort of one and one-half
times the CRS net award, plus attorneys' fees.23 2 If too many merit-
insurers. Nonetheless, some providers undoubtedly will demand payment from the in-
dividual receiving service. In such situations, the CRS payor would become immediately
liable to the individual for reimbursement.
230 If the organization extends a threshold offer and thereafter declines to make a
full CRS offer, evidence of the threshold offer and payments made pursuant to it would
be inadmissible in a subsequent trial for the purpose of proving liability. If liability is
established, the payments would be deducted from the amount of the award.
231 The depressive effect on settlement offers of reduced damages standards at trial
has escaped notice by some tort reform proponents. For example, the Attorney Gen-
eral's Working Group disingenuously concluded that eliminating recovery for pain and
suffering would not affect offers made for other injuries. THE CURRENT CRISIS, supra
note 99, at 66-69.
The fallaciousness of the Working Group's assertion is easy to see in the following
hypothetical case. Assume that a victim has compensable expenses of $100,000. If an
insurer knows that $100,000 is the maximum recovery after trial (plus attorneys' fees),
the insurer might prudently offer to settle the claim for a lesser amount, especially if
liability were less than certain. A victim, especially one who needs money immediately
to pay creditors, might be inclined to accept the offer rather than endure the delays and
uncertainty of trial. See H. LAWRENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROC-
ESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMs ADJUSTMENT 230 (1970).
232 By changing the values to be used in probability calculations, the CRS should
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less suits are filed, a state could levy attorneys' fees on unsuccessful
plaintiffs23 3 or use other techniques to discourage litigation without
unduly impeding access to the courts.
The level of damages must also be established for situations in
which the parties enter into a CRS agreement and the offeror subse-
quently fails to honor its obligations or delays payments. At the
time of the offer, the amount ultimately to be paid will often be un-
certain because a CRS offer is a commitment to pay all compensable
expenses as they arise. Given this ongoing responsibility of a third
party to make payments, disputes between the payor and claimant
over the legitimacy of claims are likely to occur in some cases. 2 4
Awarding costs of obtaining compliance plus interest with a penalty
of fifty percent of the contested amount for nonpayment and ten
percent for late payment should induce compliance. In most cases,
these narrowly defined disputes could be resolved satisfactorily
without invoking a trial court's jurisdiction.
To avoid the delays of litigation, a CRS offer might include a
clause providing for alternative dispute resolution.23 5 If both par-
ties agreed, the alternative mechanism could have exclusive and
nonreviewable jurisdiction, except that a judicial forum would be
available to remedy a CRS offeror's gross failure to honor its obliga-
tions. Proof of such failure would entitle the offeree to double dam-
induce settlement of claims that otherwise would not be paid, but not all claims. By
using the same measure of damages (except for the multiplier) for a CRS award, a court-
imposed award reduces the factors involved in deciding whether to make an award to
estimates of the probability of prevailing at trial. Based on the known risk of a 50%
increase in the size of the award, charitable organizations' economic interests would be
served by making offers where the estimated likelihood of victory is less than .67. Fac-
toring attorneys' fees into the equation would reduce the figure to about .5. Thus, in
cases in which the charitable organization will probably be held liable for the harm, the
matter should be resolved without litigation.
235 Some courts impose such an arrangement in some types of litigation. See, e.g.,
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (civil rights). At least
one commentator has proposed a system similar to the CRS, seeJeffrey O'Connell, Bal-
anced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 317, 318 (1987). See generally
WARREN FREEMAN, FRIVOLous LAwsurrs AND FRIVOLous DEFENSES 101-42 (1987) (dis-
cussing available sanctions for meritless claims and defenses in general).
234 As mentioned above, disputes may arise over either attorneys' fees or recover-
able losses. Imagine a woman falling on the rickety stairs of a community development
center and breaking her arm. Through its insurer, the center promptly makes a CRS
offer. Among the bills presented thereafter is a $500 fee from the woman's chiroprac-
tor. Investigation reveals that the bill is for several therapeutic sessions the woman re-
ceived after her fall that were part of a series begun previously and billed at twice the
rate of the earlier sessions. Believing both that the bill is excessive and that it is for
service unrelated to the broken arm, the community center's insurer refuses to pay it.
235 For a discussion on the utility of alternative dispute resolution, see JONATHAN
MARKS, EARL JOHNSON, JR. & PETER SZANTON, DispuTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA:
PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION (1984).
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ages. No proof of liability for causing the underlying injury would
be required.
6. CRS Offer Protects Volunteers and Employees from Personal
Liability
Another feature of the CRS proposal affords charitable organ-
izations the power to protect their volunteers and employees from
personal liability.23 6 Tendering a CRS offer 237 and fulfilling its
terms in good faith would insulate not only the organization, but
also its volunteers and employees from suit for CRS-covered inju-
ries. This feature would reduce concerns about volunteers' and em-
ployees' personal liability23 8 and would prevent injured parties from
both enjoying the benefits of the CRS's prompt payment features
and later pursuing an action against an individual defendant for a
full tort recovery. 23 9
By altering the measure of damages, rather than changing the
liability standard for volunteers, the CRS would send appropriate
signals about the degree of care a volunteer should exercise. Board
members would still owe duties to their organizations because the
CRS would not limit recovery for pecuniary harm that a director's
breach of duty might cause. Finally, it should be noted that state
enactment of a law based on the CRS could not diminish liability
236 Volunteers of organizations that do not qualify as charitable under the standards
established for the CRS would be unaffected. The considerations involved in establish-
ing liability rules for other types of volunteers are sufficiently different to render the
CRS less satisfactory. For governmental volunteers, the greater ability of the sponsor-
ing entity to spread losses makes indemnification a more appealing option. For non-
profit organizations that are not charitable, the greater possibilities for personal benefit
and the permissibility of the organization using its assets solely to advance the interest of
its limited membership offset the vulnerability of the volunteer.
237 In most situations, the charitable organization would make the CRS offer, but the
option would also be available to a volunteer or employee who faces personal liability
because the organization lacks the resources to meet the obligations a CRS offer would
entail.
258 Through indemnification or insurance, charitable organizations in most states
can approximate this result up to the limits of their liability coverage or available assets.
See D. KURTZ, supra note 179, at 101-07.
The California legislature enacted a statute in 1987, in response to the adverse im-
pact of personal liability on volunteerism as well as the difficulty charitable organizations
faced in obtaining liability insurance. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5239 (West Supp. 1989). The
statute protects volunteer directors and officers from third-party suits if the organization
maintains liability insurance or "if the board of directors of the corporation and the
person had made all reasonable efforts in good faith to obtain available liability insur-
ance." For a discussion of the statute, see Thomas Silk, Annual Survey of Federal Tax Law
and California Legislation Affecting Nonprofit Organizations: 1987, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 713, 729-
33 (1988). Some other states similarly predicate protection of volunteers from liability
on their host organizations maintaining insurance coverage. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3601 (Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-312(b) (1989).
239 A plaintiff might still employ such a strategy if a charitable organization and non-
charitable actor jointly caused the harm.
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under federal civil rights legislation, the Internal Revenue Code, or
other federal laws that authorize penalties against individuals in
their individual capacities. 240
7. Volunteers' Personal Liability Limited to Insurance Coverage
Currently, a person injured by a charitable organization may
usually seek recovery from both the organization and one or more
individuals who caused the harm. In response to reports of volun-
teers withholding their services because of personal liability fears,
every state has modified the liability rules for at least some types of
volunteers within the last few years. 241 Some of these new laws go
far toward their stated objectives of protecting volunteers from lia-
bility for ordinary negligence and misjudgment, but others provide
little real protection.242 Many change the liability standard from
negligence to gross negligence,243 which may require a plaintiff's
lawyer to do nothing more than redraft a complaint to assert gross
negligence when suing a volunteer. Moreover, the laws in half the
states apply only to volunteer directors and officers, and not to di-
rect service volunteers. 244
For volunteers who face personal exposure because their spon-
soring organizations have neither liability insurance nor sufficient
resources with which to pay claims, either under the CRS or other-
wise, personal liability for unintentionally caused harm should be
limited to the extent of the volunteer's applicable liability insurance,
if any.245 Limiting volunteers' liability to the extent of their insur-
240 One of these forms of liability, tax liability, is discussed in Steven Cole, Volunteer-
ism Can Be Taxing, Nat'l LJ., Nov. 13, 1989, at 13.
241 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
242 Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-732 (1989) (excludes only willful or wanton
misconduct) with GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-113.1 (1989) (no protection unless individual
acted "[iln good faith," and "[w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would exercise under similar circumstances").
243 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8133 (Supp. 1988) (but allows suits arising
from negligent operation of a motor vehicle); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-312
(Supp. 1989).
244 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5047.5 (Deering Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
870.1 (1988).
245 Because claims against volunteers are infrequent, see supra notes 71-72 and ac-
companying text, the fight over liability standards for volunteers has little to do with
compensating victims. The problem of volunteer liability is attributable almost exclu-
sively to the exposure to suit rather than the actual incidence of claims. No data suggest
that individuals injured during charitable activity currently receive substantial compen-
sation from volunteers. In the two years the author directed the Nonprofit Sector Risk &
Insurance Project, he was unable to discover a single incident in which a tort victim
recovered against the personal assets of a volunteer. Neither was such an incident
brought to the attention of Congress when the Senate held hearings on the Volunteer
Protection Act. Hearing on S. 929, supra note 71. In some cases, however, volunteers
have incurred substantial legal costs to extricate themselves from a lawsuit.
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ance coverage would produce almost exactly the same benefit as
barring claims against them, while allowing recovery if the volunteer
has insurance available to spread the loss.
Individuals ordinarily do not have the option when purchasing
insurance of choosing whether their volunteer activities will be cov-
ered;246 either the policy form is worded to include such coverage or
it is not. Bargaining over the language is rarely an option. Thus,
limiting volunteers' liability to their insurance coverage would have
at most a de minimis effect on volunteers' insurance purchasing de-
cisions. If necessary, an insurance regulation could be adopted to
prohibit excluding coverage of charitable activity otherwise within a
policy's scope. 247
The rule would make the bases for purchasing insurance to
cover charitable activities more similar to the bases for purchasing
insurance to cover business activities. If volunteers are seen as re-
source providers like shareholders, 248 charitable organizations
should not need to purchase insurance to protect them from per-
sonal liability. If volunteers are seen as employees, charitable
organizations should be able to obtain coverage for them as a stand-
ard term of policies that protect the entity. Many general liability
insurance policies explicitly exclude volunteers, 249 however, thereby
requiring charitable organizations to incur additional costs to pro-
vide their volunteers with as much protection as businesses ordina-
rily provide employees. Under the CRS, charitable organizations
would have less incentive to purchase such additional coverage,
again more nearly equating their insurance situation with that of
business firms.
B. Ambit of the CRS
Justification for almost all features of the CRS rests upon the
special attributes of charitable organizations and volunteers. A ma-
246 See sources cited supra note 82.
247 For a similar proposal, see C. TREMPER, supra note 2, at 85-89. Making coverage
for volunteer activities a mandatory feature of homeowners, renters, and other personal
insurance policies would spread the risk broadly enough so that underwriting difficulties
could be effectively disregarded.
Rather than mandating that volunteer activities be included within the coverage of
standard personal policies, a rule might require that insurers offer this coverage as an
endorsement to personal lines policies and be prohibited from cancelling or refusing to
write a policy if an individual chooses the endorsement. This alternative would allow
individuals who feel they need such protection to purchase it and would not burden all
policyholders with a hidden, albeit infinitesimal, cost. In the absence of administrative
action, courts might interpret policies to provide this coverage in order to effectuate the
reasonable expectations of policyholders.
248 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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jor difficulty in applying special rules to charitable actors is specify-
ing which entities and individuals qualify. This section suggests
criteria for determining which "charitable organizations" and "vol-
unteers" should qualify for the CRS and also recommends exclu-
sions for torts occurring in the course of certain types of activity.
1. Charitable Organizations
For purposes of the CRS, several alternative means of des-
ignating qualified organizations might be used. To accord fully with
the rationales for limiting the tort liability of charitable organ-
izations, qualification should depend on the organization producing
externalized public benefits, operating for community betterment,
and refraining from distributing its profits to private parties. CRS
goals would be further effectuated by limiting the extent of fee-for-
service financing and requiring that an organization direct its benefi-
cence toward society's least fortunate members.
Although no extant legal test for charitable status strictly re-
quires all of these characteristics, several tests share some of the as-
sumptions and rationales advanced for the CRS. Unlike a new
definition, existing legal standards offer the advantage of familiarity
and greater certainty as to whether an organization qualifies. The
discussion below examines the suitability of existing definitions and
offers suggestions for alternative approaches that would tailor the
criteria for qualification more closely to the rationales for the CRS.
a. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
The exemption provisions of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code offer the most widely recognized official designation
of charitable status. Although the qualification standards for section
501 (c)(3) are grounded on a policy determination that certain types
of organizations should not be taxed at the ordinary rates, the defi-
nition is suitable for use in the CRS as well. Already a number of
state laws use section 501(c)(3) status as the criterion for reduced
tort liability of an organization or its personnel.250
Section 501 (c) (3) criteria approximate the features of charitable
organizations that justify liability limitations for them. As discussed
in Part II, to qualify for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3), an
organization must operate for the public benefit and refrain from
distributing its net earnings to private parties. 25 1
250 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 108.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); MD. CTS.
&JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-312(a)(4) (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85W (1989);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.10 (Cum. Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8332.2 (Pur-
don Supp. 1989).
251 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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The principal differences between the section 501(c)(3) stand-
ard and the qualities warranting special tort rules are that an organ-
ization need not externalize public benefits or serve only society's
least fortunate members in order to qualify for the charitable ex-
emption. 252 An organization may be exempt if it satisfies certain op-
erational conditions, for example, being educational or scientific,
regardless of whether it recoups full value from the direct recipients
of its services. Thus, the Educational Testing Service ("ETS") qual-
ifies for exemption even though its revenues from testing equal or
exceed its expenses. 253 Whether such an organization produces an
externalized public benefit is not entirely clear. -The ETS does
waive its fees for some impoverished test takers and may keep its
prices below what a for-profit firm would charge. By engaging in a
type of activity that Congress wishes to encourage-promoting edu-
cation-ETS and similar organizations may produce some level of
externalized public benefits, albeit of a magnitude only slightly
greater than many business firms.
Qualifying for tax exemption clearly does not necessitate serv-
ing the least fortunate members of society, however. For some time,
the IRS took the position that its test for "charitable" status should
not be severed completely from charity's ancient roots of service to
the poor and distressed. Although vestiges of that position still oc-
casionally appear, the IRS and the courts have largely abandoned
that condition in favor of a "modern" understanding of "charitable"
that broadens the section 501(c)(3) category.2 54
b. Modified Section 501(c)(3) Criteria
Because the criteria for tax exemption are so well established
and roughly suitable for use in the tort context, the best strategy for
specifying CRS qualification standards may be to modify the section
501(c)(3) criteria slightly rather than adopt a wholly independent
252 See WILLIAM WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDER-
CLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); Susan Ostrander, The Problem of Poverty and Why Philan-
thropy Neglects It, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 20, at 103.
253 See ALLAN NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS 260-93 (1980); The Pleasures of Non-
profitability, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1976, at 89.
254 The controversy received its most thorough public airing when the I.R.S. elimi-
nated the requirement that section 501 (c)(3) hospitals must serve the poor to the extent
of their available resources. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. Members of the disad-
vantaged class sued on the grounds that the I.R.S. was misconstruing the meaning of
"charitable" for the purpose of tax exemption. In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973), the district court accepted that
argument, but the appeals court reversed, concluding that the word "charitable" is "ca-
pable of a definition far broader than merely the relief of the poor." Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1974). (The case went to the
United States Supreme Court, where the Court resolved it on the grounds that plaintiffs
lacked standing. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
460 [Vol. 76:401
CHARITABLE ACTIVITY
test. The easiest approach would be to consider federal tax exemp-
tion as necessary but not sufficient.255 Requirements regarding one
or both of the following conditions might be added: donative sup-
port and service to the needy. The chief drawback of adding either
of these conditions is that they are not in standard use for any other
purpose. Thus, an organization's status for purposes of the CRS
would never be certain without litigation, a proposition antithetical
to the aims of the proposal. 256
Limiting the CRS to organizations that receive public support
in the form of contributions and volunteer labor restricts applicabil-
ity of the CRS more closely to those organizations for whom it is
designed. 257 The less an organization depends on fee-for-service
income, the closer is the fit with the rationales based on redistribu-
tion of resources and the aberrations of using charitable organ-
izations for loss spreading.258 The principal issue to resolve with
regard to donative financing is the percentage of revenue that must
be derived from donations and volunteer labor rather than fees for
services. The best available analogy is the test the Internal Revenue
Service uses to determine whether an organization provides services
"substantially below cost" in determining whether services that
otherwise would not be charitable can qualify as charitable because
of their donative element. 259 Unfortunately, this is not one of the
more precise tests in the tax realm. A figure of ten to twenty-five
percent below cost suffices, based on additional factors. The higher
end of that range would satisfy the donative financing rationale for
special tort rules.
Adding a requirement that an organization materially assist the
needy would most nearly align qualification for the CRS with the
justifications for receiving that special treatment. Unfortunately, it
also would be a very difficult condition to put into practice. Service
to the poor is a fairly close substitute that is capable of verification-
assuming agreement about who is poor-but would disqualify some
organizations to which the CRS justifications apply equally well.
Disaster relief organizations like the American Red Cross, for exam-
255 With the exception of limitations on political activity, all of the tax exemption
criteria are appropriate for the tort context.
256 As a practical matter, the issue could almost always be resolved through a sum-
mary judicial hearing based on the submission of financial documents alone. If volun-
teer labor is counted toward donative support, which would be consistent with the
rationale for requiring donative financing, the necessary proof would be somewhat less
readily verifiable.
257 The inapplicability of the CRS to commercial activities of otherwise qualified
charitable organizations achieves almost the same result. See infra notes 271-79 and ac-
companying text.
258 See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
259 See Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245; Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B. 234.
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pie, deliver vital services to individuals who may be able to pay for
the services they receive, albeit not at the time they need them. The
difficulty of formulating a general standard for serving the needy
may warrant the use of the selective designation approach discussed
below. 260
c. State Law Standards
For various reasons, many states do not rely upon federal tax
law in distinguishing charitable organizations from other nonprofits.
Some states use a test other than federal tax exemption for deter-
mining which organizations are exempt from state taxes, 26' and sev-
eral states apply different criteria for determining which organ-
izations are governed by special tort rules. 26 2 Some of these alter-
native criteria are more permissive than the federal tax exemption
standard,2 63 but others are tighter and more consistent with the
CRS rationales. For example, drawing upon a prior Minnesota
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court has identified the following fac-
tors as pertinent to determining whether an organization qualifies as
"charitable" for purposes of exemption from the state ad valorem
tax:
(1) whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a signifi-
cant service to others without immediate expectation of material
reward; (2) whether the entity is supported, and to what extent, by
donations and gifts; (3) whether the recipients of the "charity" are
required to pay for the assistance received, in whole or in part; (4)
whether the income received from all sources (gifts, donations,
and payment from recipients) produces a "profit" to the entity in
the sense that the income exceeds operating and long-term main-
tenance expenses; (5) whether the beneficiaries of the "charity"
are restricted or unrestricted and, if restricted, whether the re-
striction bears a reasonable relationship to the entity's charitable
[i.e., permissible] objectives; and (6) whether dividends or some
other form of financial benefit, or assets upon dissolution, are
available to private interests, and whether the entity is organized
and operated so that any commercial activities are subordinate or
260 See infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
261 See PETER SWORDS, CHARITABLE REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS IN NEW YORK
STATE 156-57 (1981); Comment, Real Estate Tax Exemption for Federally Subsidized Housing
Corporations: Rio Vista Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 64 MINN. L. Rv.
1094, 1096-97 (1980).
262 See Krpan v. Otis Elev. Co., 226 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Allison v. Mennon-
ite Publications Bd., 123 F. Supp. 23 (W.D. Pa. 1954); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-11.5-1
(West. Supp. 1989).
263 For example, in Tennessee, "tax exemptions in favor of religious, scientific, liter-
ary and educational institutions are liberally construed, rather than strictly." George
Peabody College for Teachers v. State Bd. of Equalization, 219 Tenn. 123, 128-29, 407
S.W.2d 443, 445 (1966).
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incidental to charitable ones. 264
States applying such a test for tax exemption could also use that
status as a determination for the CRS and thereby provide a means
of determining in advance of an incident which organizations
qualify.
Some states also distinguish between public benefit and mutual
benefit organizations. California 265 and New York266 divide organ-
izations along these lines, as does the Revised Model Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act. 267 These state law categories have been developed
principally to facilitate the application of different corporation law
rules depending on who controls an organization and how assets
may be distributed at dissolution rather than on what the organ-
ization does.268
As currently constituted, the public benefit category of the Re-
vised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act and similar state codes does
not accord with CRS rationales as well as does section 501 (c) (3) sta-
tus. Being more flexible than federal tax law, however, the public
benefit standard might be tailored to suit the CRS quite well. If a
state legislature considers its state definition a more satisfactory
standard for CRS qualification, it could be used.
d. Designated Charitable Organizations
Another option would be to limit the CRS to particular organ-
izations or narrowly delimited categories of organizations that have
been specifically designated by an appropriate government body.
This approach would permit fine-tuning the ambit of the CRS to
make it available only to charitable organizations that are especiajly
264 Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 269-70 (Utah
1985); see also North Star Research Inst. v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 1, g36
N.W.2d 754 (1975) (identifying factors necessary for charitable tax-exempt status);
American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 557 A.2d 900 (Vt. 1989)
(stating test for public-use tax exemption).
265 See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-10,846 (West Supp. 1981).
266 See N.Y. NoT-FoR-Pgorrr CORP. LAw § 201 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1990).
267 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPOPAT1ON AcT § 1.40(23), (28) (1988).
268 The least restrictive example of this approach is offered by the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, which requires organizations to choose whether to incorpo-
rate as public benefit or mutual benefit corporations, but does not define the terms. On
the one hand, the commentary to the Model Act asserts that the two categories are neu-
tral with respect to purposes and merely establishes different rules that require organ-
izations of each type to be operated in certain ways. Nonetheless, statements such as
"[p]ublic benefit corporations hold themselves out as benefitting society," id. at xxvi,
suggest that the drafters of the code see a functional difference in the categories as well:
Because only the public benefit category imposes a nondistribution constraint, any
organization seeking section 501(c)(3) status would need to choose the public benefit-
alternative. The two categories substantially overlap, but are not coextensive. The New
York and California laws contain criteria which make the public benefit category more
suitable for the CRS.
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vulnerable to tort liability. If a legislature determined that tort suits
were impairing only certain types of organizations that the state val-
ued, this would be the preferred approach.
For example, some states currently set special liability stand-
ards for charitable organizations that sponsor amateur rodeos or
conduct certain sports programs.2 69 Rather than altering the crite-
ria for holding these organizations liable, states may prefer to make
them subject to the CRS. Legislatures could identify qualifying
organizations, or designate a state official to make that determina-
tion. For example, the director of the state human services depart-
ment could certify organizations that would provide needed services
but for the prohibitive cost or unavailability of liability insurance.
Instead of enumerating categories of organizations covered by
the CRS, legislatures may prefer to apply the CRS to all charitable
organizations and enumerate only exceptions. Both in abrogating
charitable immunity and in subsequently enacting limitations on the
tort liability of charities or volunteers, some states have explicitly
excluded incidents occurring at hospitals. 270 The apparent ration-
ale for this exclusion is that hospitals now operate primarily on a
fee-for-service basis. While they retain their tax-exempt status, re-
sulting in lower costs to patients, the fee-for-service basis of their
operations justifies using the tort system for loss spreading.
2. Exclusion of Business Activities
Charitable organizations that engage in commercial activities
raise different issues for tort liability. Commercial activities are suit-
able mechanisms for loss spreading and generally do not produce
positive externalities of the type commonly produced by charitable
activities. 271 Even when charitable immunity was the 'norm, some
states recognized an exception to the doctrine for harm arising from
a charitable organization's business activities. 272 Some judicial
269 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85V (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8332.1(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
270 See, e.g., Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d
128 (1955) (recognizing charitable immunity for a church after court had previously
abrogated charitable immunity for hospitals); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.38 (Baldwin
Supp. 1989) (volunteer protection statute does not diminish immunities provided for in
§ 2305.25, which states that individual or hospital is relieved from liability arising from
treatment of a patient).
271 The objective of operating a business is to raise revenue in excess of cost. The
existence of profit in the business context is an indicator that the business produces
benefits in excess of its costs to society, including tort loss costs. If a charitable organ-
ization cannot operate a business profitably on that basis, the activity is not a socially
efficient means of raising revenue. None of the rationales set forth in this Article justi-
fies applying the CRS to ordinary business operations, regardless of whether a charitable
organization happens to run the business.
272 E.g., Kaltrider v. YMCA, 457 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir. 1972) (interpreting Ohio
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opinions and statutes have recognized that the rationales for apply-
ing special tort rules have little force when applied to a charitable
organization's business activities by allowing recovery against a
charitable organization up to the amount of its noncharitable as-
sets. 273 Similarly, a charitable organization's unrelated business in-
come is not exempt from federal taxation.274
The general premise of the unrelated business income tax is
that a profit-making enterprise should pay tax regardless of whether
it dedicates its profits exclusively to charitable purposes.275 Such a
policy is necessary" to prevent charitable organizations from using
tax savings to compete unfairly against taxable enterprises and po-
tentially undermine the tax revenue base.276 For the CRS, the com-
petitive advantage that may follow from reducing charitable
organizations' liability-related expenses supports similar treatment
of business operations. The terms of this exclusion should differ
somewhat from the tax exclusion of unrelated business income,
though, because the rationales for the CRS differ from the ration-
ales for tax exemption.277
For tax purposes, the distinction between related and unrelated
business income rests on a sound basis. For tort liability, however,
no strong reason justifies distinguishing between the two types of
law); Kasten v. YMCA, 173 N.J. Super. 1, 7, 412 A.2d 1346, 1350 (1980). Massachu-
setts, which otherwise limits charitable organization's tort liability to $20,000, allows full
recovery "if the tort was committed in the course of activities primarily commercial in
character even though carried on to obtain revenue to be used for charitable purposes."
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85K (Cum. Supp. 1989).
273 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
274 I.R.C. § 511 (1989).
27- Section 502 of the 1983 Internal Revenue Code specifically provides for taxation
of "feeder organizations," separately incorporated businesses that give all their pro-
ceeds to charity. At one time, the IRS applied the destination of income test, which
provided exemption to any organization as long as its revenue was used exclusively for
charitable purposes. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden De Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581
(1924). By adding section 502, the Revenue Act of 1950 explicitly nullified the destina-
tion of income test. See SICO Found. v. United States, 295 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1961), reh'g
denied, 297 F.2d 557 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
276 See Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217 v. United States, 580 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1978); W. HARRISON WELLFORD &JANNE G. GALLAGHER,
UNFAIR CoMPETrriON?: THE CHALLENGE TO CHARITABLE TAx EXEMPTION 5-11 (1988).
The Internal Revenue Code attempts to take away all tax-related advantages that
might enable charitable organizations to operate an unrelated business in unfair compe-
tition with tax-paying firms. In addition to the unrelated business income provisions,
I.R.C. § 514 provides a complex set of rules aimed at neutralizing the tax benefits accru-
ing to a charitable organization that uses debt-financed property in the acquisition of a
business.
277 The unrelated business income tax falls only on commercial activities that are
not "substantially related" to the purpose that gives rise to exemption. See I.R.C.
§ 513(a) (1989). Under this rule, enterprises such as campus bookstores and museum
gift shops generally are not taxable even if they operate at a profit and compete directly
with privately owned enterprises. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1) (as amended in 1983).
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income. Moreover, practical difficulties would arise if an injury oc-
curred in the course of an activity producing both related and un-
related business income. For example, a medical society that
publishes a magazine may receive exempt income from member
subscriptions and taxable income from advertising.278 Which liabil-
ity rules would apply if an injury occurred during the publishing
process? Unlike income, which can be fractionally allocated, a liabil-
ity claim cannot be resolved in part under one set of rules and in
part under another.
The only remaining rationale for applying the CRS when harm
occurs in the course of a charitable organization's business activities
is that the business proceeds are used for charitable purposes. This
is a strong justification, but the analysis of Part III of this Article
finds it insufficient in and of itself to Warrant deviating from stand-
ard tort law.
The scope of the CRS should exclude any profit-making trade
or business of a charitable organization.279 In practice, this exclu-
sion would occasionally create an issue of whether an injury-causing
incident occurred in the course of a trade or business. To avoid
uncertainty, charitable organizations could isolate their profit-
making activities by incorporating them separately or otherwise
clearly delineating them. Such arrangements would have the salu-
tary effect of making the charitable sector's activities more purely
charitable.
V
CONSTrrUTIONALrrY OF THE CHARrrABLE REDRESS SYSTEM
Federal and state constitutional provisions provide several ba-
ses for challenging almost any attempt to modify the tort system.
Arguments against the constitutionality of the Charitable Redress
System may be based on equal protection, due process, or a variety
of state constitutional provisions pertaining to the courts. This dan-
ger of invalidation on constitutional grounds is not merely specula-
tive; courts have invoked each of these grounds when invalidating
various legislative restrictions on tort rights.280
278 See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 847-50
(1986).
279 This proviso would leave most traditional fund-raising and investment activities
within the CRS's scope. The Internal Revenue Code definition of trade or business in
section 513 could be used for this purpose.
280 See infra notes 287-302, 303-07 and accompanying text; see also Richard C. Turk-
ington, Constitutional Limitations on Tort Reform: Have the State Courts Placed Insurmountable
Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis, 32 ViLT. L.
REv. 1299 (1987); Kenneth Vinson, Constitutional Stumbling Blocks to Legislative Tort Reform,
15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 31 (1987).
466 [Vol. 76:401
CHARITABLE ACTIVITY
Under the federal constitution, grounds for attacking the CRS
are quite limited. The few United States Supreme Court opinions in
this area give legislatures substantial freedom to alter common-law
tort liability and damages. 281 Commentators generally agree with
this viewpoint. 282 The Court upheld the aggregate damages limit
that Congress imposed in the event of a nuclear power plant acci-
dent283 and dismissed for want of a substantial federal question an
appeal of a state supreme court decision upholding a medical mal-
practice damages cap. 2s4 Unless the Court deviates substantially
from precedent, the CRS appears safe from a federally based chal-
lenge, although some lower federal courts have found constitutional
infirmities in contested "tort reform" measures. 28 5
Challenges to legislative restrictions on tort recoveries have
met with greater success when based on state constitutions. 28 6 The
variety of state constitutional provisions precludes definitive assess-
ment of the constitutionality of the CRS within the scope of this Ar-
ticle, but the major sources of vulnerability can be examined. As a
general matter, the CRS compares favorably with state law modifica-
tions that have passed constitutional review and it does not have any
of the major features that have led to invalidation. Of particular im-
portance is that the CRS embodies a trade-off of features, not
merely a reduction of tort claimants' rights. The CRS provides for
lower compensation of individuals injured in the course of charita-
ble activity in exchange for a greater likelihood of some recovery for
such individuals as well as higher levels of charitable activity and the
281 See text accompanying notes 283-84.
282 See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 617 n.270. Sugarman asserted:
I have long been unimpressed with the claim that states cannot simply
repeal tort law for personal injuries without thereby depriving people of
due process rights. Such thinking reflects a long-past era ofjudicial in-
trusion into legislative policymaking in the area of economics and social
welfare on substantive due process grounds.
Id.
283 See Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978); see also
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916) (rejecting constitutional challenges
by employers to workers' compensation system).
284 See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
285 See, e.g., Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-07 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(Medical Malpractice Act which limited recovery to $500,000 regardless of extent of
injury violated equal protection clause).
286 See Turkington, supra note 280, at 1302. State constitutions cannot restrict any
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, but they may provide an independ-
ent basis for additional rights that do not undercut the Constitution's guarantees. See
WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1977); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Reec-
tion of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REv. 353 (1984).
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community benefits that result from it. Moreover, the CRS does not
completely bar access to the courts or arbitrarily limit recoveries.
A. Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
The CRS invites an equal protection challenge because it cre-
ates different legal rights depending on the nature of the claim, the
status of the defendant, and the amount of damages sought. Be-
cause several CRS provisions would touch various constitutionally
protected rights, the CRS would also be vulnerable to an attack
based on substantive due process, which would differ very little from
an equal protection claim.287
The fate of previous constitutional challenges along these lines
has depended principally upon the standard of review that courts
have applied.288 The few courts that have conceived of a damages
limitation as infringing a fundamental interest typically have in-
voked strict scrutiny analysis and invalidated the law. For example,
in Kenyon v. Hammer,289 the Arizona Supreme Court predicated its
strict scrutiny analysis on a provision of the state constitution that
creates a fundamental right to bring and pursue tort claims, includ-
ing medical malpractice actions. 290 Although recognizing the com-
pelling state interests in reducing the cost of medical care and
increasing the availability of such care, the court found those inter-
ests insufficient to overcome the discriminatory effect of the special
privilege that the law conferred upon one class of defendants. 291
Similarly, other courts have held that damage caps violate equal
287 Instead of objecting to the distinctions a statute creates, a substantive due proc-
ess attack focuses on the statute's diminution of pre-existing rights. Because the basis
for the claim would be the rights that the CRS affects rather than the classes it creates,
analysis under substantive due process would be almost indistinguishable from analysis
under equal protection. As Justice Stewart insightfiully observed, if the claim is that a
law infringes upon a right and not that it disadvantages a class, equal protection "is no
more than substantive due process by another name." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
288 See Ronald E. Wagner & Jesse M. Reiter, Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice:
Standards of Constitutional Review, DET. C.L. REV. 1005, 1006-11 (1987). Even when inter-
preting their own constitutions, state courts generally use the levels of review that the
United States Supreme Court has developed for federal equal protection analysis.
289 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984).
290 AiZ. CONST. art 2. § 31.
[The imposition of an absolute bar three years from the date of injury on
most-but not all-medical malpractice claimants, the abolition of gen-
eral tolling provisions recognized for all other tort claims and the internal
distinctions between classes of medical malpractice claimants, all discrim-
inate against and among medical malpractice claimants in a manner
which infringes upon fundamental rights.
142 Ariz. 69, 86, 688 P.2d 961, 979 (1984).
291 It is one thing, however, to regulate by classification in setting up reason-
able periods within which to bring an action, and it is another thing to
confer a special privilege upon one class of defendants by effectively abol-
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protection because they provide full recovery to individuals with
small claims, while denying a full recovery to individuals with more
serious and costly injuries.2 92
Courts that have ruled that damage limits do not infringe a fun-
damental right have generally invoked the rational basis test for
equal protection review.2 93 Under traditional rational basis review,
courts have permitted legislatures to address problems "one step at
a time.''294 When applying the rational basis test to laws providing
for different tort rules in some situations, most courts have upheld
the laws. Even under rational basis review, however, some courts
have invalidated damage caps that produced no benefits in ex-
change for denying recoveries to seriously injured individuals. 295
Because the interests at stake in tort litigation do not dearly
meet the criteria that the Supreme Court has established for identi-
fying fundamental rights,296 yet are closely tied to rights that the
federal and state constitutions explicitly protect, an intermediate
level of review provides the most suitable mode of analysis. 297 This
form of equal protection jurisprudence requires judges to assess the
strength of the interests on each side of the policy and to examine
ishing the opportunity for those with even the most meritorious claims to
assert them.
142 Ariz. 69, 87, 688 P.2d 961, 979 (1984).
292 See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 944, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980) ("[A]
statute which singles out seriously injured malpractice victims whose future damages
exceed $50,000 and requires one class to shoulder the burden inherent in a periodic
payments scheme from which the general public benefits offends basic notions of fair-
ness and justice."). This holding was limited by Stati v. Brosseau, 124 N.H. 184, 470
A.2d 869 (1983) (Douglas & Batchelder, JJ., concurring specially) (continued existence
of sovereign immunity depends on whether restrictions placed on injured party's right
to recovery are outweighed by the benefits conferred to the general public).
293 See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P. 2d 665, 211
Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Turkington, supra note 280, at
1310-13.
294 Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). The California
Supreme Court cited Lee in upholding a periodic damages payment arrangement that
applied only to medical service providers. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 370, 683 P.2d 670, 677, 204 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1980) (en banc).
295 See, e.g., Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-07 (N.D. Tex. 1986);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978); Baptist Hosp. Inc. v. Baber,
672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
296 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
297 As early as Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-21 (1970),Justice Marshall
expressed his preference for a sliding scale analysis that would require the court to ex-
amine "the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individ-
uals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not
receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification." Id at 521 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). For a more recent discussion, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 468-72 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part, dissenting in part).
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the closeness of the fit between a statute's ends and means. Courts
that have used an intermediate level of review in assessing the con-
stitutionality of tort modifications have reached mixed results. 298
Some state courts require that an offsetting benefit to injured
parties accompany any legislative reduction of common-law tort
claims. 299 Not all courts insist upon this quid pro quo standard,300
however, and the United States Supreme Court has cast great doubt
upon its necessity under the federal constitution. In dictum the
Supreme Court has stated, "[I]t is not at all clear that the Due Proc-
ess Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation
scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a
reasonable substitute remedy."30'
Because the CRS does not merely limit damages, but instead
offers a comprehensive alternative to ordinary tort rules, much like
workers' compensation, it may satisfy the quid pro quo test. The
CRS should be constitutionally unobjectionable, especially if courts
take account of all the benefits of adopting it. However, if courts
limit their inquiry to the balance of benefits and losses to injured
parties entitled to compensation under ordinary tort rules, the CRS
may be vulnerable.30 2
Attempting to apply the quid pro quo test to the CRS may lead
courts to question the appropriateness of the test itself. If the status
quo is charitable immunity, adopting the CRS would actually result
in enhanced recoveries for plaintiffs and hence not raise a due proc-
ess issue. In states that accepted charitable immunity at the time
they adopted their constitutions but subsequently abandoned the
doctrine, the outcome of a challenge might depend on the historical
moment that a court chooses for comparison. Are limitations on
298 See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (case remanded to determine if a substantial relationship
existed between damages cap and state interests in enacting it).
299 See, e.g., Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. 1102; Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080,
1088 (Fla. 1973); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); Sax v. Votteler, 648
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (providing shorter statute of limitations for minor medical mal-
practice plaintiffs than other plaintiffs invalid because it effectively abolished a minor's
right to bring a well-established common-law cause of action without providing a rea-
sonable alternative).
300 See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1986); Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 162-63, 695 P.2d 665, 683, 211 Cal. Rptr.
368, 386, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
301 Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978); see also New
York Cent. R.R. v. White 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1916) (rejecting constitutional challenges
to workers' compensation system).
302 Benefits that less directly offset limitations on injured parties' recoveries have
not always entered into a court's assessment of whether the quid pro quo is sufficient.
See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742
(1976) (lower insurance premiums and lower medical expenses for all members of soci-
ety not sufficient to offset loss of recovery by malpractice victims).
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tort recoveries permissible if they are no more restrictive than the
common law has ever been? Or is the modification of common-law
liability unidirectional and nonreversible, that is, can courts and leg-
islatures adopt rules that increase recoveries but not thereafter cut
back? The odd results of this analysis suggest the inadvisability of
placing too much emphasis on the recoveries and limitations at
common law. Tort law has long been in flux and is likely to con-
tinue its evolutionary development as circumstances change. Using
the due process clause to constrict legislatures' flexibility arbitrarily
freezes the legal status quo.
B. Other Constitutional Issues
While equal protection and due process have been the work-
horses in plaintiffs' assaults on damage limitations, they have not
borne the load alone. Arguments based on procedural due process,
the right to jury trial, separation of powers, prohibitions against spe-
cial legislation, access to the courts, and a right to recover damages
have also been mounted, sometimes successfully.303 The CRS may
be susceptible to attack on these grounds in some states, although
the better-reasoned opinions have rejected such contentions in
cases challenging tort modifications that are not as evenly balanced
as the CRS.
Although based on slightly different specific constitutional pro-
visions, most of the precedents in this area turn on consideration of
the appropriate roles of courts and legislatures in establishing and
enforcing tort rules. In abolishing charitable immunity, the Florida
Supreme Court declared that the state constitution's guarantee of
court access prohibits all limitations on tort recoveries.30 4 The Kan-
sas Supreme Court reached the same conclusion based on the guar-
antee in the Kansas Bill of Rights that every person have a legal
remedy.30 5 More recently, courts have used similar grounds to
invalidate a wide variety of procedural tort modifications.30 6
303 See infra notes 304-06 and accompanying text; see also Leo Kanowitz, Alternative
Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest. The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 239,
290-92 (1987); Vinson, supra note 280, at 45.
304 See Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1953); see also Oien v. City
of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 286 (S.D. 1986) (law extending government immunity to
various municipal operations violates right to court access).
305 Neely v. St Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 192 Kan. 716, 720, 391 P.2d
155, 158 (1964) (statute that confers immunity from process on nonprofit hospitals vio-
lative of section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights which provides that all persons injured
"in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice
administered without delay").
306 See, e.g.,Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983) (review panel violates
right of access to courts); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626
(1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (statute of limitations barring medical malprac-
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Although interpreting either of these provisions as prohibiting leg-
islative modification of tort remedies is contrary to the weight of
authority, 0 7 the possibility of such an interpretation must be ac-
knowledged. Prospects of invalidation are dimming though, as
more states shift toward the majority view.
The supreme courts of both Montana and Virginia recently
adopted the majority position despite previous opinions nullifying
legislative tort modifications. In an opinion containing a lengthy
discussion of the historical purposes of constitutional protection of
courts' integrity and availability to the public, the Montana Supreme
Court upheld a legislative limitation on recovery for wrongful termi-
nation of employment. In Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc.,S3s the court
specifically overruled a 1985 holding that a law extending govern-
mental immunity to certain municipal operations violates the right
to redress.30 9 Similarly, in Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,310 the
Virginia Supreme Court held that the Virginia Constitution does
not prohibit legislative modification of tort rules. This decision ren-
dered ineffective an earlier federal district court's contrary interpre-
tation of the state constitution.3 1' With respect to the right to jury
trial, Etherde followed the United States Supreme Court view that
the guarantee protects only trial rights existing at common law,
which did not include plenary authority for juries to award dam-
ages.3 12 Regarding the separation of powers, the court concluded
that the power to create or modify a remedy lies with the leg-
islature.3 13
Of special note is the 1989 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's decision in English v. New England Medical Center, Inc.31 4 Eng-
lish upheld a 1971 statute that abolished charitable immunity but
limited a charitable organization's liability to $20,000. Although the
tice claims brought more than four years after alleged malpractice even if plaintiffs did
not or could not have known of their injuries violates right to remedy).
307 [A] constitutional provision that courts ofjustice shall be open to every
person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for
every injury to person, property, or reputation, is not intended as a limi-
tation upon the legislative branch of the government where the legisla-
tion involved deals with rightful subjects of legislation.
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 616, at 564 (2d ed. 1979).
308 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
309 Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495 (1985).
310 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
311 Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986). The district court's rulings
that the Virginia law violated provisions of the United States Constitution were reversed
in Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989), which is consistent with results
in other circuits.
312 Etheridge, 237 Va. at 96, 376 S.E.2d at 529 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88-89 n.32 (1978)).
313 Id. at 101, 376 S.E.2d at 532.
314 405 Mass. 423, 541 N.E.2d 329 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990).
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court devoted most of its opinion to rejecting the plaintiffs' due
process attack, the court also expressed agreement with the majority
position that a damage limitation does not infringe upon constitu-
tionally protected jury trial rights. 3 15
A review of the precedents strongly suggests that the CRS
should pass constitutional muster in every state, although the issue
will be in doubt in some states until a judicial determination is
made. Because the CRS is a balanced and comprehensive modifica-
tion of tort rules for charitable organizations and volunteers, much
like workers' compensation systems, it should survive constitutional
attack even in states that have rejected piecemeal or asymmetrical
tort modifications.
CONCLUSION
Implicit in every decision to modify or discontinue an activity
because of an undesirable level of injuries is the assumption that the
change will result in less harm. For most activities, this assumption
undoubtedly is correct. For example, installing air bags in
automobiles should reduce injuries from traffic accidents both be-
cause the airbags will better protect motorists and because the addi-
tional cost of airbags will reduce the total amount of driving. The
injury-reducing consequences of the first factor are readily predict-
able if the air bags operate effectively. The effect of reduced driving
on injuries is not as predictable, however. Total injuries will be
lower only if the substitute activities of would-be drivers are less in-
jury-producing. What if everyone who can no longer afford an auto-
mobile purchases a motorcycle and rides it as much as they would
have driven an automobile. Injuries quite probably would rise!
In the charitable sector, the current tort system routinely pro-
duces the negative result of a relatively safe activity giving way to a
much riskier alternative. Consider the low-budget youth sports pro-
gram that conducts a baseball league each summer with poorly
trained volunteer coaches on an ill-kept diamond. Under these cir-
cumstances, injuries might well occur and suits for negligence could
lie. The preferable response to this prospect of liability would be a
baseball league with better coaches and improved facilities. How-
ever, assuming fixed resources-a reasonable assumption in the
charitable sector-the more likely alternative is discontinuation of
the program. Without organized baseball, will the children who had
been on the teams sit in their rooms reading books or engaging in
other activities with a lower probability of injury? Doubtful. They
315 Id. at 426-27, 541 N.E.2d at 331-32; see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc.,
273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
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are more likely to continue playing ball without adult supervision on
whatever field they can find or to engage in some other un-
supervised activity that entails risks many times greater than the na-
tional pastime.
This example could be multiplied a thousand times across the
charitable sector. The alternative to a hazardous homeless shelter is
more likely to be no shelter than one that is safe and secure. More-
over, allocating resources to improve a shelter will ordinarily neces-
sitate serving fewer homeless people. The consequences in this
arena are much different than those that occur if a hotel is built with
fewer rooms but greater safety features, or with its full complement
of rooms to let at a higher rate. 16 The tort system provides hotel
operators and guests with an appropriate set of economic cues for
making a cost-benefit analysis. In the charitable sector, those cues
are badly distorted. Although the imposition of liability points char-
itable actors in the direction of greater care, the ordinary tort dam-
ages standard deters them inappropriately because charitable actors
do not receive a full economic return for the benefits they produce.
The Charitable Redress System offers a better alternative for
encouraging prudence and compensating tort victims. By relying
primarily on first-party insurance and government assistance pro-
grams, the CRS would spread many losses without the inefficiencies
of shifting them to a third party. Recognizing the often desperate
need for money by injured individuals who neither have private in-
surance nor qualify for government assistance, the CRS would com-
pel charitable organizations to provide financial assistance. As a
result, more of the individuals who are severely economically disad-
vantaged by an accident or other loss would receive compensation
and would receive it swiftly.
Under the CRS, incentives and protections that are more suita-
ble for the charitable sector would replace the tort system's dis-
torting effects on charitable activity. Volunteers would no longer
need to risk their personal assets when they serve their communi-
ties. On the whole, charitable organizations could reduce their lia-
bility-related expenses while simultaneously increasing their liability
insurance coverage to provide a source of recovery for harm that
they cause.317 Tort victims would receive compensation at a level
316 In these scenarios the market will establish a level of safety consistent with con-
sumer demand. At the bottom end of the market, especially for private goods provided
without charge, choices among gradations of quality (safety) may be replaced by a di-
chotomous choice between availability and nonavailability.
317 Adopting the CRS would create an opportunity to reduce charitable organ-
izations' liability-related expenses, but would not do so directly. The essential mediat-
ing step is appropriate adjustment of liability insurance premiums. If insurers treat
charitable organizations like business firms, the CRS will have little effect on charitable
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more nearly equivalent to the benefits that charitable organizations
ordinarily provide to their beneficiaries. The combination of these
advantages weighs heavily in favor of the Charitable Redress System
over either ordinary tort rules or the current legislative trend to
raise liability standards for some charitable organizations and
volunteers.
organizations' actual liability-related expenses regardless of reductions in claims costs.
Because the handling of cases under the CRS will differ from the handling under the tort
system, separate data collection and analysis will become ever more critical for fair in-
surance pricing.
If insurers do not reduce premiums, charitable organizations may move more rap-
idly toward alternatives to the commercial insurance market such as pools and risk re-
tention groups. Although the need for large sums of money to capitalize these
alternative mechanisms impedes their creation by small charitable organizations that
might benefit most from their operation, the potential savings may trigger an infusion of
funds from private foundations and other sources. The viability of these alternatives is
demonstrated by the handful of entities that currently exist to serve a broad spectrum of
charitable organizations. See B. STONE & C. NORTH, supra note 80, at 26-28; Christina
Lee, Non-Profits Scrounge for Cover: Some Groups Forming Pools, J. Commerce, July 31, 1989,
at 9A, col. 4; Nonprofit Organizations Grapple With the Vagaries of Liability Insurance, Wall St.
J., June 22, 1989, at 1, col. 4. An even greater number of alternative risk financing
mechanisms operate on behalf of relatively homogeneous portions of the charitable sec-
tor, e.g., hospitals, schools, and religious institutions. See Gilbert Fuchsberg, Colleges
Forming Liability-Insurance Companies to Guarantee Coverage, Keep Premiums Down, Chron.
Higher Educ., Nov. 16, 1988, at A29, col. 3.
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